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RECENT CASES
Antitrust Law-Conspiracy To Eliminate Discounters
From Automobile Market a Per Se Violation
of Sherman Act
The United States brought a civil action under section 1 of the
Sherman Act' against General Motors Corporation and three associa-
tions of Chevrolet dealers in the Los Angeles area. The complainant
sought to enjoin defendants from conspiring to prevent certain fran-
chised dealers from maintaining sales relationships with discount
houses. As a result of pressure from dealers injured by such practices,2
General Motors notified all franchisees that "in some instances" the dis-
count practices represented violations of the Dealer Selling Agree-
ments, and elicited promises from the dealers to discontinue the rela-
tionships. The defendant associations jointly financed the policing of
these promises and, as violations were discovered, General Motors en-
forced compliance. The defendants contended that their activities were
a lawful attempt to enforce the "one location clause" in the Dealer
Selling Agreements,3 while the government maintained that a provision
limiting sales to discounters was unlawful since it amounted to a boy-
cott and would have the effect of maintaining resale prices. The dis-
trict court held that General Motors was legally entitled to enforce its
contracts and that the mere requests of some of the dealers for General
Motors' assistance would not support the findings of a conspiracy.4 On
direct appeal5 to the United States Supreme Court, held, reversed and
remanded. Elimination of discount houses from access to the retail
1. "Every contract, combination in the form of trust or otherwise, or conspiracy, in
restraint of trade or commerce among the several States, or with foreign nations, is de-
clared to be illegal. ... 26 Stat. 209 (1890), as amended, 15 U.S.C. § 1 (1964).
2. Frequently the discount outlets involved were located near the non-participating
franchisees. As a result, these dealers were injured not only through lost sales, but also
by having to perform warranty services on vehicles which the discounters marketed.
The discounter-dealer sales relationships were basically of two types: (1) "referral
selling, whereby the discounter would obtain the customer and refer him to the dealer;
and (2) "bootlegging," whereby the dealer would actually sell the vehicle to the dis-
counter for resale. Most of the arrangements were of the referral type. United States
v. General Motors Corp., 384 U.S. 127, 131-32 (1966).
3. This clause prohibited a dealer from establishing "a new or different location,
branch sales office, branch service station, or place of business . . . without prior written
approval of Chevrolet." Id. at 130.
4. United States v. General Motors Corp., 234 F. Supp 85, 89 (S.D. Cal. 1964).
5. A direct appeal was taken under the Expediting Act § 2, 32 Stat. 823 (1903), as
amended, 15 U.S.C. § 29 (1964).
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automobile market by joint collaborative action on the part of auto-
mobile dealers, their associations, and the manufacturer constitutes a
per se violation of the Sherman Act. United States v. General Motors
Corp., 384 U.S. 127 (1966).
A successful prosecution for a section 1 Sherman Act violation re-
quires the finding of a "contract, combination.., or conspiracy ... in
restraint of trade." In Standard Oil of New Jersey v. United States,6
the Supreme Court established the criteria for determining the exist-
ence of such a restraint. Standard Oil held that the Sherman Act pro-
hibits only those restraints of trade found to be unreasonable, and that
the application of this "rule of reason" requires that the ends sought
in each case be weighed against the means used to achieve them. The
Standard Oil Court also indicated that some activities would constitute
a per se violation of the act.7 Boycotts and resale price-maintenance
schemes, for example, are per se violations which have been enjoined
regardless of their purpose or effect.8 Of the two, resale price-mainten-
ance has presented the more subtle problems.' Contracts for resale
price-maintenance were declared per se violations by the Supreme
Court in Dr. Miles Medical Co. v. John D. Park & Sons Co.10 However,
United States v. Colgate & Co."- appeared to limit Dr. Miles by de-
claring that a manufacturer has the right to "announce in advance the
circumstances under which he will refuse to sell" and to stop dealing
with a distributor for "reasons sufficient to himself."'2  Theoretically,
then, a manufacturer could refuse to deal with distributors in further-
ance of a price-maintenance scheme despite the earlier ruling that a
6. 221 U.S. 1 (1911).
7. The court stated that the restraint imposed by some activities would be so great that
their unreasonableness would be conclusively presumed. Id. at 65.
8. "Boycott" as used in this article means to refrain by group action from purchasing
or supplying certain goods and/or services or from dealing with certain individuals or
classes of individuals. "Resale price-maintenance" as used in this article means vertical
price control, i.e., a supplier attempts to control the price at which his product is re-
sold by his customer.
9. Boycotts have been enjoined even in the face of a clear showing that competition
has not been lessened. Klor's, Inc. v. Broadway-Hale Stores, Inc. 359 U.S. 207 (1959).
See also Fashion Originators' Guild of America, Inc. v. FTC, 312 U.S. 457 (1941)
wherein the purpose of the boycott was to curb tortious activities. The Court held that
the purpose of the boycott was immaterial. Other cases include Eastern States Retail
Lumber Dealers' Ass'n v. United States, 234 U.S. 600 (1914). On resale price-mainte-
nance, see cases discussed in text accompanying notes 10-16 infra. See also Turner, The
Definition of Agreement Under the Sherman Act: Conscious Parallelism and Refusals to
Deal, 75 HAv. L. REv. 655 (1962); Rahl, Conspiracy and the Anti-Trust Laws, 44
ILL. L. REv. 743 (1950).
10. 220 U.S. 373 (1911).
11. 250 U.S. 300 (1919). In this case the district court interpreted the criminal in-
dictment as having failed to charge an agreement, and the Supreme Court felt bound
by this interpretation. No conviction can be had on conspiracy charges without a show-
ing of agreement.
12. Id. at 307.
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price-maintenance was unlawful per se. Subsequent cases, however,
rendered almost illusory this supposed right by holding that refusals
to deal could not be used in furtherance of a combination to restrain
trade. In the year following Colgate, the Supreme Court extended the
per se illegality of resale price-maintenance schemes to cases involving
implied agreements. 13 Thus, if an agreement can be implied from a
course of dealing, the fact that the manufacturer, as in Colgate, fur-
thered his scheme by refusing to deal is no defense. Any substantial
element beyond simple refusal to deal will support the finding of an
implied agreement.14 The narrow limits of the theoretical right an-
nounced in Colgate are illustrated in United States v. Parke, Davis &
Co.'s There the manufacturer refused to deal with retailers who sold
below a designated price and with the wholesalers who continued to
supply those retailers. By involving the wholesalers in its scheme to
stop the flow of its goods to those retailers, Parke, Davis & Co. created
a combination in restraint of trade and thus removed itself from the
protective sphere of Colgate.16
Although both the government and General Motors urged the im-
portance of the "one location clause," the Supreme Court considered
neither the scope of the clause nor its enforceability in light of the
antitrust laws. Rather, it found a "classic conspiracy in restraint of
trade," to eliminate a class of competitors.' 7 The essential elements
of a conspiracy were found in the dealers' solicitation of General
Motors' aid, the promises obtained from the violators by General
Motors, and the joint policing of those promises.' Stating that where
joint action is involved, no finding of explicit agreement is necessary,
the majority concluded that the promises obtained from the offending
dealers created a "fabric interwoven by many strands of joint action." 9
The Court noted that this joint action contained the elements of two
13. United States v. A. Schrader's Son, Inc. 252 U.S. 85 (1920).
14. In United States v. Bausch & Lomb Optical Co., 321 U.S. 707 (1944), in which
a distributor refused to supply those dealers who violated a price schedule, the Court
stated, "Whether this conspiracy and combination was achieved by agreement or by
acquiescence of the wholesalers coupled with assistance in effectuating its purpose is
immaterial." Id. at 723. In FTC v. Beech-Nut Packing Co., 257 U.S. 441 (1922), the
Court stated, in effect, that a trader is not guilty of violating the Sherman Act by merely
refusing to sell to those who will not sell his goods at the prices he wishes, but he may
not go further and by contracts or combinations, express or implied, unduly hinder the
free flow of commerce. Id. at 452-53. Referring to Colgate and Schrader's in Frey &
Son, Inc. v. Cudahy Packing Co., 256 U.S. 208 (1921), the Court said, "Apparently the
former case . . . [Colgate] was misapprehended. The latter opinion ... [Schradels]
distinctly stated that the essential agreement, combination or conspiracy might be implied
from a course of dealing or other circumstances." Id. at 210.
15. 362 U.S. 29 (1960).
16. Id. at 45-46.
17. 384 U.S. at 139-40.
18. Id. at 143.
19. Id. at 142-44.
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per se violations, boycotts and resale price-maintenance. The elimina-
tion of the discounters from the market was accomplished by a boy-
cott,20 and a collateral effect of this combination was a substantial
restraint upon price competition, a per se violation under Parke,
Davis.
21
The General Motors opinion indicates that any combination result-
ing in a substantial restraint upon a competitor's access to the market
or upon price competition is a per se violation of the Sherman Act. 2
When Parke, Davis and the instant case are considered together, it
would seem that quite narrow limits have been placed upon a sup-
plier's use of refusals to deal. The two decisions raise a strong pre-
sumption of illegality whenever refusals to deal are used to control
either prices or a competitor's access to a market in which the supplier
has many customers.2 3 This raises a question as to the present status of
Colgate. Parke, Davis held that the right to refuse to deal, as set forth
in Colgate, cannot be used to induce group compliance with a price-
maintenance scheme.2 The General Motors case did not further limit
this right; in fact, the Court explicitly reserved the question of General
20. Ibid.
21. Id. at 147. Mr. Justice Harlan submitted a concurring opinion in which he stated
that although he considered Parke, Davis & Co. to represent a basically unsound anti-
trust doctrine, he could not escape the fact that its rule governed this case. Id. at 148-
49. Although Parke, Davis & Co. involved alleged price-fixing, and the instant case
involved boycotting, Mr. Justice Harlan could see no reason for differentiating the two
cases. In the Parke, Davis case, Mr. Justice Harlan dissented on the ground that Parke,
Davis & Co.'s conduct was permissible under the Colgate doctrine. He felt that what
the Court was really doing in Parke, Davis & Co. was overruling Colgate while profess-
ing to distinguish it. United States v. Parke, Davis & Co., supra note 15, at 49. In the
instant case Harlan conditioned his concurring opinion on his interpretation of the ma-
jority opinion as saying nothing to prevent General Motors from enforcing the "one
location clause" by unilateral action. 384 U.S. at 148.
22. "And the per se rule applies even when the effect upon prices is indirect." 384
U.S. at 147.
23. One could make an argument that the presumption is conclusive but the facts of
the two cases must be considered. In each case the primary defendant held a large
market share and sold to many customers who were involved in intrabrand as well as
interbrand competition. The cases therefore do not indicate what would be the result
when only interbrand competition is involved. It is too early to say that this area too
is subject to a per se rule.
24. The majority opinion in Parke, Davis & Co. makes clear that it is not overruling
Colgate, although under their interpretation, the Colgate privilege is severely limited.
362 U.S. at 44. For opinions that Parke, Davis & Co. leaves some life in Colgate, see
Levi, The Parke, Davis-Colgate Doctrine: The Ban on Resale Price Maintenance, THE
StPREmE CounT REviv 258, 325 (Kurland ed. 1960) suggesting that the protected
area of Colgate extends only to first purchasers; Bicks, The Enforcement Policies of
the Department of Justice and the Small Businessman, 16 A.B.A. ANTn TRtUsT SECTION
54, 55 (1960) wherein the then Acting Assistant Attorney General in charge of the
Antitrust Division interpreted Parke, Davis & Co. as sounding "the death knell for verti-
cal price fixing activities - except to the extent protected by state law - beyond the
manufacturer's simple unilateral refusal to deal with price cutting retailers."
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Motors' right to enforce the "one location clause" unilaterally.2
As the Court noted, the case does have similarities to situations in-
volving boycotts and price-fixing, but the purpose of the combination
is more complex. General Motors was not concerned with maintaining
resale prices, nor with denying the discounters access to the market.
Rather, it was threatening refusal to deal in an effort to protect its
distribution system, and this additional factor, the presence of the
franchise as a distributional system, makes the per se approach unde-
sirable in this situation.26 The determination of the unreasonableness
of the restraints imposed by this particular franchise system should
include consideration of such factors as: (1) the extent of interbrand
competition promoted by the system; (2) the degree of increased
efficiency in production and distribution; and (3) the increased po-
tential for market development. If the restraint imposed upon inter-
brand competition by the system is unreasonable in light of these
considerations, the inquiry need go no further. But even if the system
is reasonable in terms of interbrand competition, a determination must
still be made as to the reasonableness of the system's restraints upon
intrabrand competition. This determination turns upon a balancing of
the need for the distributional system with the detrimental effects it
produces upon competition at the dealer-discounter level. Here, the
relevant considerations go beyond price competition and include such
elements of competition at the consumer level as pre-delivery servicing
and warranty maintenance. If the restraints imposed by the distribu-
tion scheme are unreasonable because of the burden upon intrabrand
competition, then the Sherman Act has been violated.
In this case these questions were not reached. The Court found a
situation similar to boycotts and price-fixing, and apparently classified
the entire system as a per se violation without considering the eco-
nomic benefits which the franchise system might contain. The Court
has repeatedly stated that it protects competition rather than com-
25. 384 U.S. at 139-40. See Boro Hall Corp. v. General Motors Corp., 124 F.2d 822
(2d Cir. 1942), rehearing denied, 130 F.2d 196 (2d Cir. 1942), holding that General
Motors could, under the "one location clause" restrict a dealer from establishing a used
car lot outside his area.
26. For an excellent study, economically oriented, of restricted distributional practices
in various types of industries disfavoring the per se approach to such problems under
the antitrust laws, see Note, 75 HAv. L. REv. 795 (1962). The article concludes that
the business analysis of the vertical restraints indicated that oftentimes the manu-
facturer-supplier's interest in higher sales volume and interbrand competition actually
is pro-competitive and sufficient justification for the exclusive arrangements employed.
See also ATr'Y GEN. NAT'L CoMm. ANIrusT REP. 29 (1955) wherein the committee
concludes that where exclusive dealerships result in merely ancillary restraints, reason-
ably necessary to protect the parties' main lawful business purposes, they should be up-
held when the effect is not to unreasonably foreclose competition within the dealer's
market.
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petitors,2 7 but recent decisions under the Clayton Act2 indicate that
the Court actually equates an increased number of competitors with
increased competition.2 The Court's concern in the instant case for
the discounters, rather than competition, parallels its use of the numeri-
cal test in the merger field. If the Court continues its present trend
toward labeling as per se violations any arrangement which has the
effect of reducing or restricting the numbers of competitors, business-
men must face the problems of distribution in new ways. One sug-
gested solution is the operation of vertically integrated outlets,30 but
the effect of this plan would be to squeeze out small businessmen who
now perform such distribution functions, a result surely not within the
spirit of the antitrust laws.31 A more practical solution is underway in
a proposal to amend the Sherman Act to provide that exclusive ter-
ritorial franchises, under limited circumstances, do not constitute re-
straints of trade.2
Antitrust Law-Merger of Two Major Competitors in
Industry with History of Concentration
Violates Section 7 of Clayton Act
The United States sued to enjoin the merger of Von's Grocery
Company and its direct competitor, Shopping Bag Food Stores, as a
violation of section 7 of the Clayton Act.' Prior to the merger, Von's
ranked third in sales in the Los Angeles grocery market with 4.7 per
cent of the sales, and Shopping Bag ranked sixth with 4.2 per cent.
The merger created the second largest grocery chain in Los Angeles
with 7.5 per cent of total sales. The evidence revealed a history of
concentration in the Los Angeles retail grocery industry. Acquisitions
and mergers within the industry were occurring at an increasingly
rapid rate. Both Von's and Shopping Bag were expanding firms,
although neither had acquired new outlets by merger. The district
court held that there was "not a reasonable probability" that the
27. See, e.g., Brown Shoe Co. v. United States, 370 U.S. 294, 320 (1962).
28. Section 7, 38 Stat. 731 (1914), as amended, 15 U.S.C. § 18 (1964).
29. United States v. Von's Grocery Co., 86 Sup. Ct. 1478 (1966), in which the Court
struck down a merger as causing a substantial lessening of competition, indicating that
the crucial point was the total decrease in the number of separate competitors.
30. This possible result was suggested in Stewart, Franchise or Protected Territory
Distribution, 8 ANmarusT BuILL. 447 (1963).
31. See United States v. Von's Grocery Co., supra note 29; Brown Shoe Co. v. United
States, supra note 27.
32. See S. 2549, 89th Cong. 1st Sess. § 1, 2 (1965).
1. 38 Stat. 731 (1914), as amended, 15 U.S.C. § 18 (1964).
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merger would tend "substantially to lessen competition or "create a
monopoly" in violation of section 7.2 On appeal3 to the Supreme
Court of the United States, held, reversed. The merger of two major
competitors in an industry marked by a long and continuous trend
toward concentration violates section 7 of the Clayton Act. United
States v. Von's Grocery Co., 384 U.S. 270 (1966).
Section 7 of the Clayton Act, as amended by the Celler-Kefauver
Act of 1950,4 proscribes any acquisition where "in any line of com-
merce in any section of the country, the effect may be substantially
to lessen competition or tend to create a monopoly." The tests em-
ployed in implementing the statute can be classified under two broad
standards: (1) the per se standard,5 which is characterized by the
assumption that an analysis of the structural characteristics of the
market will be determinant of the competitive effects of a merger; and
(2) the rule-of-reason standard, which employs a case-by-case analysis
of all relevant economic and structural factors with a view toward the
determination of the probable economic consequences of a merger.7
The Supreme Court first interpreted the amended section 7 in
Brown Shoe Co. v. United States.8 Speaking for the majority in that
case, Mr. Chief justice Warren viewed the amendment as indicating
congressional concern with the "rising tide of economic concentration
in the American economy."9 He stated that "[tjaken as a whole, the
legislative history (of the amendment) illuminates congressional
concern with the protection of competition, not competitors, and its
desire to restrain mergers only to the extent that such combinations
may tend to lessen competition."'0 The Court then engaged in the
process of determining the relevant "line of commerce" (product
2. 233 F. Supp. 976, 985 (S.D. Cal. 1964).
3. Appeal was brought under section 2 of the Expediting Act, 58 Stat. 272 (1944),
as amended, 15 U.S.C. § 29 (1964).
4. 64 Stat. 1125 (1950), 15 U.S.C. § 18 (1964).
5. The earliest application of this standard appeared in Standard Oil Co. v. United
States, 337 U.S. 293 (1949), a case under section 3 of the Clayton Act, where the Court
adopted the rule of "quantitative substantiality." This rule states in essence that when
a merger forecloses a quantitatively substantial portion of the market, it is legitimate
to infer a significant lessening of competition. Under this test substantiality is deter-
mined in absolute rather than relative terms.
6. In Transamerica Corp. v. Board of Governors, 206 F.2d 163 (3d Cir.), cert. denied,
346 U.S. 901 (1953), the circuit court rejected the quantitative substantiality test in
its application to section 7 cases and turned to the rule-of-reason approach. See
also In the Matter of Pillsbury Mills, Inc., 50 F.T.C. 555 (1953).
7. Comment, 11 WAYNE L. REv. 739, 754 (1965).
8. 370 U.S. 294 (1962).
9. Id. at 315.
10. Id. at 320. In repeating this phrase later in the opinion the Court added a
significant dictum: "But we cannot fail to recognize Congress' desire to promote
competition through the protection of viable, small, locally owned businesses." Id.
at 344.
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market) and the "section of the country" (geographic market) within
which the probable effect of the merger was to be measured. In
ruling the merger in violation of section 7, the Court placed particular
emphasis upon the market share l to be controlled by the merging
companies and the history of concentration in the industry, and
presented an elaborate array of economic data to support their con-
clusion. The Brown Shoe decision was hailed as supporting a variety
of interpretations of section 7, but it was generally concluded that the
Court had adopted the "rule-of-reason" approach.' 2 However, in
United States v. Philadelphia Nat'l Bank13 the Court began a retreat
from the empirical analysis which characterized Brown Shoe in favor
of the application of mechanical tests, stating that the "intense con-
gressional concern with the trend toward concentration warrants,
dispensing, in certain cases with elaborate proof of market structure,
market behavior, or probable anticompetitive effects."'4 This state-
ment and the now-famous footnote 4215 became the holding in two
subsequent cases under section 7. In United States v. Aluminum Co.
of America 6 and United States v. Continental Can Co.,'7 the Court
failed to follow the Brown Shoe mandate and largely ignored the
economic evidence presented by the parties, while dealing extensively
with the structural aspects of the market.'8 This trend away from
the rule-of-reason approach 9 has been marked by an increasing ten-
dency to find a probable lessening of competition wherever there is a
11. The Brown Shoe merger had both horizontal and vertical aspects. In discussing
the market share to be controlled by the merging companies, the Court viewed the
market from the purchaser's point of view, while the horizontal aspects of the
merger actually involved the manufacturer's market. However, it is clear that the Court
intended the market share to be an important factor in determining the competitive
effects of any horizontal acquisition brought before it under section 7.
12. Bock, The Relativity of Economic Evidence in Merger Cases-Emerging Deci-
sions Force the Issue, 63 Micr. L. RFv. 1355, 1357 (1963).
13. 374 U.S. 321 (1963). The Court invalidated a merger between the second and
third largest of Philadelphia's 42 commercial banks.
14. Id. at 363.
15. "It is no answer that, among the three presently largest firms . . . , there will
be no increase in concentration.... [I]f concentration is already great the importance
of preventing even slight increases in concentration and so preserving the possibility
of eventual deconcentration is correspondingly great." Id. at 365 n.42.
16. 377 U.S. 271 (1964). The Court invalidated the acquisition by Alcoa of the
Rome Cable Corp. Alcoa manufactured aluminum conductor and Rome produced
copper conductor.
17. 378 U.S. 441 (1964). The Court declared Continental Can's (the second largest
producer of metal containers) acquisition of the Hazel-Atlas Glass Company (the third
largest producer of glass containers) in violation of section 7.
18. Note, 10 VmL. L. Rav. 734, 757 (1965).
19. The movement from the rule-of-reason approach to a per se standard has also
characterized the FTC decisions under section 7. E.g., compare In the Matter of




possibility of injury to a competitor.20 Two rules seem to be emerging.
First, "where concentration is already great, even slight increases must
be prevented; and second, where there is a strong trend toward oligo-
poly, further tendencies in that direction are to be curbed in their
incipiency, whatever the number or vigor of the remaining competi-
tors."2'
In the instant case, the Court was faced with deciding the validity
of a horizontal merger22 in a market with a large number of competi-
tors. Again it adopted the per se standard. Speaking for the majority,
Mr. Justice Black stated that the purpose of the antitrust laws is "to
preserve competition among a large number of sellers." 3 He then
noted a decline in the number of grocery companies operating in the
Los Angeles market in recent years, accompanied by a large number
of mergers over the same period. To the Court, these facts presented
"exactly the threatening trend toward concentration which Congress
wanted to halt."24 The Court concluded that any merger between
large firms in a market characterized by a continuous trend toward
fewer and fewer competitors would be in violation of section 7. Mr.
Justice Stewart, joined by Mr. Justice Harlan, dissented, criticizing
the majority for basing its decision "apparently on the theory that
the degree of competition is invariably proportional to the number of
competitors ... ."25 Citing Brown Shoe, he stated that every corporate
acquisition is to be judged in light of the contemporary economic
context of its industry and that the purpose of section 7 is to protect
competition, not competitors.2
The opinion in the instant case affirns the Court's concern with
concentration of industry in the economy and its dedication to the
20. Rill, The Trend Toward Social Competition under Section 7 of the Clayton Act,
54 GEO. L.J. 891, 898-99 (1966).
21. Singer, The Concept of Relative Concentration in Antitrust Law, 52 A.B.A.J.
246,248 (1966).
22. "An economic arrangement between companies performing similar functions in
the production or sale of comparable goods or services is characterized as 'horizontal.'"
Brown Shoe Co. v. United States, 370 U.S. 294, 334 (1962).
23. 384 U.S. 270, 274 (1966). In footnote Mr. Justice Black quoted the famous
dictum of Judge Learned Hand in United States v. Aluminum Co. of America, 148
F.2d 416, 429 (2d Cir. 1945): "Throughout the history of these statutes it has been
constantly assumed that one of their purposes was to perpetuate and preserve, for its
own sake and in spite of possible cost, an organization of industry in small units which
can effectively compete with each other." 384 U.S. at 274 n.7.
24. 384 U.S. at 277.
25. Id. at 282 (dissenting opinion).
26. The dissent further pointed out that "[ilt is only among the single-store operators
that the decline in the unit number of competitors, so heavily relied on by the Court,
has taken place. Yet the tables . . . show not a trace of merger activity involving
the acquisition of single-store operators." id. at 293. The dissent also criticized the
majority's failure to recognize the market extension aspects of the merger and those
preceding it. Id. at 295.
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per se approach when dealing with horizontal mergers. In reaching
the conclusion that concentration in the Los Angeles retail grocery
industry had progressed to the point that it must be halted, the Court
applied the simplest available criterion-a history of a decreasing
number of competitors in the market. The ramifications of this decision
offer several grounds for comment. First, the application of the per se
standard may present problems in borderline cases. In the instant
case the Court was dealing with a "large" industry containing a large
number of sellers, yet, to the Court, the industry was concentrated. In
future cases the courts must determine a point at which the differences
in market structure will be considered.-" Furthermore, if the Von's
rule is to apply only to large firms in a concentrated industry, the
courts must find some criteria to be used in separating the large
firms, which would be prohibited from participating in mergers, from
the small firms where mergers might be allowed. However, these
problems can be largely avoided if the enforcement agencies select
only those cases that will lend themselves to the easy application of
structural tests.28
Second, the Court's assertion that the antitrust laws are aimed at
preventing concentration and preserving competition among a large
number of sellers suggests that these laws have a dual purpose. The
prevention of concentration in the economy stems from what the
Court terms the "intense congressional concern with the trend toward
concentration."2 9 Undoubtedly, the "intense congressional concern"
centered around the concentration of economic power into the hands
of a few, but while the Court has interpreted "concentration" as a
lessening of the number of competitors, concentration of economic
power does not necessarily result from fewer competitors. The
preservation of competition desired by the Court is not merely the
preservation of any and all competition, but the preservation of a
kind of competition, i.e., competition among a large number of
sellers. However, the preservation of a large number of sellers does
not necessarily result in the preservation of the optimum level of
workable competition. For example, some mergers which result in a
decrease in the number of competitors may actually increase effec-
tive competition.30 In describing the effects of the acquisition of
Shopping Bag by Von's, the Court stated: "What we have.., is simply
27. For example, a national steel industry composed of 100 producers would probably
not be concentrated. Yet, in the instant case the Los Angeles grocery market, with
over 3000 sellers was held to be concentrated.
28. Dirlam, Recent Developments in the Anti-Merger Policy: A Diversity of Stan-
dards, 9 ANm=usT BuLL. 381, 407 (1964).
29. United States v. Philadelphia Nat'l Bank, 374 U.S. 321, 363 (1963).




the case of two already powerful companies merging in a way which
makes them even more powerful than they were before. If ever such
a merger would not violate f 7, certainly it does when it takes place
in a market characterized by a long and continuous trend toward
fewer and fewer owner-competitors . . . ."31 The logical implications
of this statement would suggest invalidation of any merger involving
large firms in an industry evidencing a history of concentration,
regardless of the competitive effects of the acquisition. Such a rule,
on its face, would be inconsistent with the language and the con-
gressional intent of the amended section 7.32 The position of the Court
implies that there may be a level of concentration within a given
market beyond which no mergers will be allowed. The difficulties in
determining this point are obvious, but of greater concern is the
possibility that by creating a mergerless market, the Court may stifle
progress within the industry. In such a mergerless situation, the
Court might be preserving marginal competitors by depriving them of
the ability to sell their operation at a profit. Preserving this kind of
competition would be preserving little or no competition at all. The
Court's approach in the instant case reflects the view that the
preservation of a large number of sellers is itself a socially and politi-
cally desirable result to be achieved under the antitrust laws.33 By
equating these social and political values with the law's traditional
goals, the Court has made it difficult to clearly define our basic anti-
trust policy under section 7. The adoption of the per se standard
will add certainty to cases arising under that section, but certainty
is no substitute for an economic policy aimed at encouraging the
optimum level of workable and effective competition.34
31. 384 U.S. at 278. (Emphasis added.) Mr. Justice White concurred solely on the
basis of this statement. Id. at 280.
32. The primary concern of Congress in adopting the 1950 amendment was to stop
the socially and politically undesirable concentration of economic power into the bands
of a few. Although the legislative history does not evidence a consensus on any
particular standard to be applied in section 7 cases, it does indicate that Congress
envisioned the courts examining relevant economic factors to determine anticompetitive
effects. See H.R. REP. 1191, 81st Cong., 2d Sess. (1950); S. REP. 1775, 81st Cong.,
2d Sess. (1950). The Attorney General's committee in 1955 expressed similar standards.
REP. OF THE Arr'Y GENERAi's COMM. ON THE ANTITRUST LAWS 122 (1955).
33. See KAYsEN & TURNER, ANTRmus-T POLIcY 11-23 (1959); MAssEL, COxrwETnON
AND MONOPOLY 16-19 (1962).
34. Since the Von's Grocery decision the Court has restated its determination to
rely on structural tests in interpreting section 7. In United States v. Pabst Brewing
Co., 384 U.S. 901 (1966), the Court held that proof of the relevant geographic
market within which competitive effects must be measured will no longer be required
as an element of proof of a prima facie case under section 7. Further, the Court
held that the government need not prove that the trend toward concentration in the
industry was caused by mergers.
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RECENT CASES
Criminal Law-Future Confessions Will Be
Inadmissible Unless Specified Pre-trial
Procedures Are Followed
Defendant, a mentally disturbed indigent, was arrested and taken
to a police station where he was identified by the complaining witness
and interrogated by police officers. After two hours of interrogation
the defendant signed a written confession which included a typed
statement that the confession was made voluntarily, without threats
or promises, and "with full knowledge of my legal rights." However,
at no time was defendant apprised of his right to have counsel
present during the questioning. Over the objection of defense
counsel, the trial court admitted into evidence the written confession
and the testimony concerning the prior oral confession. The jury
found the defendant guilty of kidnapping and rape and the Arizona
Supreme Court affinrned the conviction, relying heavily upon the
fact that the defendant made no request for counsel prior to or
during the interrogation.' On certiorari to the United States Supreme
Court, held, reversed. Where the defendant is not apprised of his
right to counsel during the interrogation, and where there is no
other effective protection of his privilege against self-incrimination,
the mere signing of a typed statement that he has full knowledge of
his legal rights does not constitute an intelligent waiver of these
rights. Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1966) .2
The fifth amendment privilege against self-incrimination has been
applied to state court proceedings through the due process clause
of the fourteenth amendment. This privilege is the constitutional
1. State v. Miranda, 98 Ariz. 18, 28, 401 P.2d 721, 731 (1964). The Arizona
Supreme Court also stated that Miranda had experienced encounters with the police
which were sufficient to enable him to know what his constitutional rights were without
a meticulous apprisal by the police, where such might be required for a less experienced
accused. Thus the Arizona court appears to have espoused a subjective test for
determining when an accused must be informed of his rights prior to interrogation.
See Way, The Supreme Court and State Coerced Confessions, 12 J. PuB. L. 53, 57
(1963); see also Kamisar, What Is An Involuntary ConfessionP, 17 RuTGEas L. REv.
728 (1963).
2. Three other cases were decided in the Miranda opinion, and they each shared
with Miranda the common feature of "incommunicado interrogation of individuals in
a police-dominated atmosphere, resulting in self-incriminating statements without
full warnings of constitutional rights." The interrogators elicited an oral confession in
each case and signed admissions in three cases. The Court used the broad factual
situations presented in these cases to support a holding which included certain
requirements for safeguarding the constitutional rights of the accused in all situations
where police interrogation takes place.,'Vignera v. New York, 384 U.S. 436 (1966);
Westover v. United States, 384 U.S. 436 (1966); California v. Stewart, 384 U.S. 436
(1966).
3. Malloy v. Hogan, 378 U.S. 1 (1964). Defendant was held in contempt by the
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foundation,4 if not the historical foundation,5 upon which the inad-
missibility of involuntary confessions is based. Early decisions did
not apply this privilege to the states, but language in some opinions
clearly foreshadowed a change. In Twining v. New Jersey,6 holding
the fifth amendment privilege against self-incrimination not applica-
ble to the states through the fourteenth amendment, Mr. justice
Moody stated that "it is possible that some of the personal rights safe-
guarded by the first eight Amendments against National action may
also be safeguarded against state action, because a denial of them
would be a denial of due process of law .... [I]f this is so, it is not
because those rights are enumerated in the first eight Amendments,
but because they are of such a nature that they are included in the
conception of due process of law."7 Brown v. Mississippi8 was the
first case to apply the federal standard of inadmissibility to a state
case involving a coerced confession.9 Since the physical coercion
there involved was so brutal,10 the Court had little difficulty in
deciding that such action by law enforcement officials was not con-
sistent with the "fundamental principles of liberty and justice" required
by the due process clause."- As the state cases developed, the
standard for testing the admissibility of coerced confessions came
to be the same as that applied in federal prosecutions since Brain v.
United States.'2 The primary concern was whether the confession was
Supreme Court of Connecticut for failing to testify concerning his implication in a
gambling pool. The United States Supreme Court released defendant, applying the
fourteenth amendment to guarantee to defendants in state proceedings the protections
afforded by the fifth amendment to federal prisoners.
4. Brain v. United States, 168 U.S. 532 (1897). In this case involving a confession
of murder, the Court stated: "In criminal trials, in courts of the United States,
wherever a question arises whether a confession is incompetent because not voluntary,
the issue is controlled by ...the Fifth Amendment .... " Id. at 542.
5. This contention is asserted by Justices Harlan and White, dissenting in Miranda,
who contend that the rule against the admissibility of involuntary confessions developed
independently of the privilege against self-incrimination, and the latter historically
pertained to the defendant's privilege against incriminating himself during a criminal
proceeding rather than during in-custody interrogation. They contend the inadmis-
sibility of involuntary confessions is a rule founded in evidence and is not dependent
in any way upon the privilege against self-incrimination. See 3 WiGMonE, EVIDENCE,
§ 823, at 249 (3d ed. 1940); see also Morgan, The Privilege Against Self-Incrlmina-
tion, 34 Mn'N. L. REv. 1, 18 (1949).
6. 211 U.S. 78 (1908).
7. Id. at 99.
8. 297 U.S. 278 (1936).
9. This rule had obtained'in federal proceedings since Brain v. Untied States, supra
note 4.
10. Defendants were threatened by unruly mobs and beaten severely on several
occasions by deputies with whips and leather belts until confessions were secured.
11. Brown v. Mississippi, supra note 8, at 286. In Brown the Court side-stepped
Twining and declared that "the privilege against self-incrimination is not here involved
.... Compulson by torture to extort a confession is a different matter." Id. at 285.
12. Malloy v. Hogan, supra note 3 (citing Brain v. United States, supra note 4).
"free and voluntary"13 in order "to prevent fundamental unfairness
in the use of evidence, whether true or false." 14 The Supreme Court
generally has adhered to the practice of determining the admissibility
of a confession by investigating the probable, rather than the actual,
effect of the police methods used.15  It is now clear that police
conduct need not be so uncivilized that it shocks the conscience of
the court for it to be held in violation of due process. It is sufficient
if the confession is obtained under such circumstances as refusing to
allow the accused to phone his wife,16 the overbearing atmosphere of
official interrogation, 7 or mere trickery by the interrogators.' The
primary questions are "whether the defendant's will was overborne
at the time he confessed," " and whether the confession was the
"product of any meaningful act of volition."20 The Court has an-
nounced that the question of voluntariness of confessions must be
answered by an examination of the total circumstances surrounding
the arrest and interrogation of the accused.2' In this examination, such
factors as failing to remind the defendant that he is under arrest,
failing to warn him that he may remain silent and that his statements
may be used against him, and failing to advise him of his right to
have counsel are considered as attendant circumstances bearing upon
the admissibility of his confession, regardless of "[w]hatever independ-
ent consequence these factors may otherwise have .... .,22
E.g., Haynes v. Washington, 373 U.S. 503 (1963) (defendant could not call his wife
until he confessed); Lynumn v. Illinois, 372 U.S. 528 (1963) (defendant was told
that unless she cooperated state financial aid to her children would be discontinued);
Spano v. New York, 360 U.S. 315 (1959) (defendant could not see retained counsel
until he confessed); Ashcraft v. Tennessee, 322 U.S. 143 (1944) (36 hours of in-
communicado interrogation prior to confession).
13. Brain v. United States, supra note 4, at 542.
14. Lisenba v. California, 314 U.S. 219, 236 (1941).
15. The McNabb-Mallory rule, which is applied in federal courts, is said to be
objective in that it looks only to the procedure followed by the police rather than
to the actual effect such procedure has on the particular accused. McNabb v. United
States, 318 U.S. 332 (1942); Mallory v. United States, 354 U.S. 449 (1957). This rule
in federal courts has doubtless influenced the trend toward an objective test of coerced
confessions in state cases. See Spanogle, The Use of Coerced Confessions in State
Courts, 17 VND. L. RPv. 421, 438-47 (1964). However, the Court has not remained
deaf to the different conditions of particular defendants. E.g., Culombe v. Connecticut,
367 U.S. 568 (1961) (an illiterate mental defective); Blackburn v. Alabama, 361 U.S.
199 (1961) (an insane Negro); Spano v. New York, supra note 12 (an ignorant Italian
immigrant); Crooker v. California, 357 U.S. 433 (1958) (defendant with one year
of law school training held to know his rights and therefore not "taken advantage of");
Haley v. Ohio, 332 U.S. 596 (1948) (a fifteen-year-old Negro).
16. Haynes v. Washington, supra note 12.
17. Spano v. New York, supra note 12.
18. Massiah v. United States, 377 U.S. 201 (1964).
19. Lynumn v. Illinois, supra note 12, at 534.
20. Blackburn v. Alabama, supra note 15, at 211.
21. Haynes v. Washington, supra note 12.
22. Id. at 517.
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Whether the defendant was given his constitutional right to counsel
has become increasingly significant in determining the admissibility
of a particular confession. Gideon v. Wainwright2 3 made this sixth
amendment 24 guarantee applicable to the states through the due
process clause of the fourteenth amendment. Thereafter, the right
was extended in a federal case, Massiah v. United States,25 to include
pre-trial aid of counsel; the holding was considered applicable to the
states through Gideon on the theory that this right was co-extensive
in state and federal courts.26 Attempting to dispel any doubt con-
ceming the applicability of Massiah in state proceedings, Escobedo
v. Illinois held the right to counsel exists the moment police investiga-
tion focuses upon a suspect and the proceeding thereby takes on an
accusatorial rather than an investigatorial character.27 The decision,
however, left a vague directive for satisfying the constitutional re-
quirements of pre-trial criminal procedure, and state courts have
differed significantly in their interpretation of Escobedo.
Chief Justice Warren's majority' opinion in Miranda recognized the
need to delineate specific procedural safeguards that would guarantee
the fifth amendment privilege against self-incrimination to an accused
during in-custody interrogation. The Court reasoned that present
day police methods utilizing incommunicado interrogation as a means
of procuring confessions are no less violative of the fifth amendment,
as a result of the psychological character of the coercive pressure,
than were the physical methods employed in former years. The
opinion asserted that the modem use of "third degree" practices
allows police to rely extensively upon self-incriminating evidence
obtained by pressuring the accused. In this manner, the Court
articulated an intimate relationship between the constitutional privi-
lege against self-incrimination and police custodial interrogation.
Countering the argument that restrictions on in-custody interrogations
will seriously impede effective law enforcement, the Court pointed
to the exemplary record in law enforcement established by the FBI
which employs substantially the same safeguards as called for in this
decision. Emphasizing that the individual's privilege against self-
incrimination can best be protected by guaranteeing the assistance
23. 372 U.S. 335 (1963).
24. U.S. CONST. amend. VI: "In all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy
the right . . .to have the Assistance of Counsel for his defence."
25. Supra note 18.
26. See Dowling, Escobedo and Beyond, 56 J. ClUM. L., C.&P.S. 143, 151 n.57
(1965).
27. Escobedo v. Illinois, 378 U.S. 478 (1964). Since the defendant did not have
counsel at the moment the police investigation focused upon him, the Court ruled that
the confession obtained from him was inadmissable and reversed the conviction.
28. Justices Black, Brennan, Douglas, Fortas, and Warren comprise the majority.
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of counsel at an early stage, the Court established the following safe-
guards as a prerequisite to the admissibility of any statement made
by the defendant. Before any interrogation, the accused must be (1)
advised of his right to remain silent, (2) warned that any statement
may be used against him, (3) advised of his right to have counsel
during interrogation, (4) told that if he is indigent counsel will be
appointed, and (5) advised that he may cut off the interrogation at
any time. These requirements attach when an individual is first taken
into custody or otherwise deprived of his freedom. Furthermore, if
the government claims the defendant waived his rights, it now has the
the burden of showing that these requirements were fulfilled and that
the waiver was made knowingly and intelligently. Mr. Justice White
dissented, 9 contending that judicial precedent for connecting the
rule against coerced confessions with the fifth amendment was un-
sound and far from unanimous. He also expressed the fear that the
majority opinion gave too little consideration to the protection of the
rights of the general public through effective law enforcement.
Miranda dispels any doubt which may have existed concerning the
requirements of Escobedo with respect to pre-trial procedures and
their effect upon the rights of the accused. The five safeguards set
out in Miranda, together with the requirement of a knowing and
intelligent waiver prior to any questioning in the absence of counsel,
represent a judicial codification of the procedural steps necessary to
protect the constitutional rights of an individual from the time he is
taken into custody. General on-the-scene questioning of suspects per-
taining to the facts surrounding the crime is not prohibited by this
ruling, nor are spontaneous, volunteered confessions likely to be
held inadmissible. However, it is imperative that no accusatory inter-
rogation proceed without all five of the specific warnings. It is clear
that an accused may effectively waive his rights, but the burden of
proving a knowing and intelligent waiver rests upon the prosecution.
This burden will undoubtedly force police departments to renovate
their facilities and regulations in an effort to establish evidence that
these safeguards were provided in each case.30 It should be noted
29. Justices Harlan and Stewart joined in this dissent. Mr. Justice Harlan with whom
Justices White and Stewart joined, thought the majority exaggerated the prevalence
of third degree practices, that those who do use them now will equally be able to
lie about warnings and waivers in the future, and that the rights of society are
jeopardized by this decision. He further challenged the constitutional basis of the
decision and charged that it was an erroneous mix-up of sixth amendment reasoning
with a fifth amendment premise. Mr. Justice Clark believed the "totality of circum-
stances" rule should be continued with these safeguards considered as attendant
circumstances, rather than arbitrarily applying the rigid fifth amendment test an-
nounced by the majority.
30. National Legal Aid and Defender Ass'n, Defender Newsletter Vol. III No. 4,
July 1966, suggested for example, that officers carry plastic cards with the prescribed
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that the Court indicated that a rapid, ritualistic warning would not
effectively apprise an individual of his rights. Electronic devices, such
as sealed cameras and recorders, may prove helpful in establishing that
the defendant knowingly waived his rights. It also seems axiomatic
that police stations should have ready access to an attorney or public
defender at all times. There has been an abundance of speculation
on the possible deleterious effect of Miranda on the efficiency of future
law enforcement. However, in light of the success enjoyed by the
FBI, which has functioned for years under substantially the same
procedures as set out in Miranda, it would appear that local law
enforcement agencies will not be rendered ineffective by this decision.
Escobedo and Miranda are applicable only prospectively.31 Habeas
corpus cases or cases on appeal from trials which began prior to
Miranda will be affected, however, in that the absence of the specific
safeguards required by Miranda will be considered as attending cir-
cumstances under the "totality of circumstances" rule of Haynes v.
Washington.32 It is conceivable that the absence of some or all of
these safeguards might add enough to the circumstances demonstrat-
ing coercion to require the inadmissibility of a confession admissible
under pre-Miranda law. Miranda left several questions unanswered
and several terms undefined however. Since the decision requires the
specified safeguards "unless other fully effective means are devised,"
future decisions may define what other procedures are equally as
effective in protecting the individual's fifth amendment privilege.
Future litigation with respect to the admissibility of confessions seem-
ingly will focus on such questions as whether the accused was in
custody within the meaning of Miranda, whether the incriminating
statement was spontaneously volunteered, whether an illegal interro-
gation under Miranda tainted other evidence, and whether the de-
fendant's waiver was a knowing and intelligent one. For example,
though the majority makes it clear that an accused may revoke his
waiver at any time, it does not say whether he may invoke his waiver
at any time. In a case decided since Miranda, the defendant argued
that once an accused asks for counsel he cannot waive his rights and
be questioned until counsel arrives. The federal district court how-
ever, ruled that such a waiver was effective and that subsequent ques-
tioning was permissible under Miranda.P Since the five directives
warnings written on them.
31. Johnson v. New Jersey, 384 U.S. 719 (1966). Escobedo and Miranda wero
decided on June 22, 1964 and June 13, 1966 respectively.
32. E.g., Davis v. North Carolina, 384 U.S. 737 (1966) (taking these factors into
consideration, but obviously not needing them in reversing the conviction).
33. United States v. Arnold, (M.D. Tenn. July 1966) (Crim. No. 13672). Defendant
had asked for his attorney, but his attorney was unavailable; he then consented to be
questioned. Judge Miller reasoned that so long as the primary requirement of knowledge
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listed by the Miranda Court obviously do not present a complete
solution to the problems surrounding pre-trial criminal procedure,
more specific guidelines are needed, and the extensive efforts in
trying to devise legislation on the subject have not been wasted.
Juvenile Courts-Juvenile* Delinquent Entitled to
Hearing On Question of Waiver of Jurisdiction
Kent, a sixteen-year-old boy,1 was tried and convicted for robbery
and housebreaking 2 in a criminal proceeding in a federal district court.
Upon his arrest, the defendant moved for a hearing before the
juvenile court on the question of whether the juvenile court should
waive its exclusive jurisdiction. Defendant also moved for access to
his Social Service file3 which was available to the juvenile court.
After full investigation, however, the juvenile judge waived jurisdic-
tion4 and directed that the defendant be tried as an adult under the
criminal procedures of the district court. At the trial, Kent moved to
dismiss the indictment on the ground that the juvenile court's waiver
was defective since the court stated no reasons for the waiver, made
no findings, and denied him access to his Social Service file.5 The
and intelligence was present, there was nothing in Miranda to prohibit a waiver at any
time.
1. Defendant was subject to the exclusive jurisdiction of the juvenile court. D.C.
CODE ANN. § 11-907 (1961), now § 11-1551 (Supp. V, 1966).
2. Defendant was previously on probation with the juvenile court for a prior
offense. Kent v. United States, 383 U.S. 541, 543 (1966).
3. The Social Service file contains such matters as the case worker's report on the
child, prior delinquency, and background including home life and emotional problems.
4. D.C. CODE ANN. § 11-914 (1961), now § 11-1553 (Supp. V, 1966) states the
circumstances in which jurisdiction may be waived and the child held for trial under
adult procedures. "If a child sixteen years of age or older is charged with an offense
which would amount to a felony in the case of an adult, or any child charged with
an offense which if committed by an adult is punishable by death or life imprisonment,
the judge may, after full investigation, waive jurisdiction and order such child held
for trial under the regular procedure of the court which would have jurisdiction of
such offense if committed by an adult; or such other court may exercise the powers
conferred upon the juvenile court in this subchapter in conducting and disposing
of such cases."
5. Defendant also contended that his detention and interrogation were unlawful; that
the police failed to follow the procedure described by the Juvenile Court Act since
they failed to notify the child's parents and. the Juvenile Court itself; that petitioner
was deprived of his liberty for about h week without ja determination of probable
cause which would have been required in the:case of an adult; that he was inter-
rogated by the police without warnings of his rights to remain silent or advice as to
his right to counsel in violation of rights that he would have if he were an adult;
that petitioner was fingerprinted in violation of the asserted intent of the Juvenile
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district court denied the motion because the statute did not require
a hearing,6 and the District of Columbia Court of Appeals affirmed.7
On certiorari to the United States Supreme Court, held, reversed.
Read in the context of due process and the right to counsel, the
District of Columbia Juvenile Court Act entitles the juvenile defendant
to a hearing on the question of waiver, access to his Social Service
file, and a statement of reasons for the court's decision. Kent v.
United States, 383 U.S. 541 (1966).
Juvenile delinquency matters in all jurisdictions are considered to
be civil rather than criminal.8 Accordingly, constitutional rights
relevant to criminal cases are not necessarily provided in juvenile
proceedings.9 Nevertheless, some courts have held that due process,10
or "fundamental fairness"" may require the application of certain
specific constitutional safeguards to insure that the adjudication of
the juvenile is not unjustly made.12 Generally, however, the ado-
lescent's only rights are those provided by statute and those secured
by due process as that concept is applicable to civil actions.13 The
philosophy underlying the civil classification of juvenile proceedings is
that the state, acting as parens patriae,14 is determining how best to
Court Act; and that the fingerprints were unlawfully used in the district court proceed-
ing. 383 U.S. at 551.
6. The district court refused to go beyond the juvenile judge's recital that his order
was entered after "full investigation." 383 U.S. at 549.
7. Kent v. United States, 343 F.2d 247 (D.C. Cir. 1965).
8. Pee v. United States, 274 F.2d 556 (D.C. Cir. 1959); Thomas v. United States,
121 F.2d 905, 907 (D.C. Cir. 1941); Cinque v. Boyd, 99 Conn. 70, 121 Ad. 678,
680-81 (1923). For a complete list of all jurisdictions that have provisions to the
effect that an adjudication of delinquency is not a conviction of a crime, see Pee v.
United States, supra at 561-62 app. A.
9. White v. Reid, 125 F. Supp. 647 (D.D.C. 1954); People v. Silverstein, 121 Cal.
App. 2d 140, 262 P.2d 656 (Dist. Ct. App. 1953); Petition of Morin, 95 N.H. 518, 68
A.2d 668 (1949); In re Holmes, 379 Pa. 599, 109 A.2d 523, cert. denied, 348 U.S.
973 (1954).
10. See, e.g., People v. Dotson, 46 Cal. 2d 891, 299 P.2d 875 (1956); In to
Contreras, 109 Cal. App. 2d 787, 241 P.2d 631 (Dist. Ct. App. 1952).
11. See, e.g., Harling v. United States, 295 F.2d 161, 163 (D.C. Cir. 1961); United
States v. Dickerson, 271 F.2d 487 (D.C. Cir. 1959).
12. E.g., In re Poff, 135 F. Supp. 224 (D.D.C. 1955) (right to counsel applied).
Contra, In re Holmes, supra note 9. Hampton v. State, 167 Ala. 73, 52 So. 659
(1910) (privilege against self-incrimination extended). Contra, In re Santillanes, 47
N.M. 140, 138 P.2d 503 (1943); In re Mont, 175 Pa. Super. 150, 103 A.2d 460
(1954). Trimble v. Stone, 187 F. Supp. 483 (D.D.C. 1960) (right to bail applied).
Contra, In re Holmes, supra note 9. In re Mantell, 157 Neb. 900, 62 N.W.2d 308
(1954) (right to confront witness applied). Contra, Cinque v. Boyd, supra note 8.
Garza v. State, 369 S.W.2d 36 (Tex. Crim. App. 1963) (freedom from double
jeopardy extended). Contra, In re Satillanes, supra.
13. Matter of McDonald, 153 A.2d 651, 654 (D.C. Munic. Ct. App. 1959).
14. The action is civil in that the state acts as parens patriae for the child's pro-
tection in the way it does in a guardianship matter and not accusing the child with a
view to punishment as it does in a prosecution for crime. United States ex rel Yonick
v. Briggs, 266 Fed. 434 (W.D. Pa. 1920) (no right to trial by jury since not trial for
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serve the interests of a delinquent child. If necessary, the state will
provide care and assistance in order to make him a useful member of
society.15 While many jurisdictions give the juvenile court exclusive
control over the determination,16 several of these allow the court to
waive its jurisdiction so that the minor may be prosecuted as an
adult in criminal court.17 A waiver of jurisdiction by the juvenile
court amounts to a determination that a youth would not benefit
from the special treatment afforded by the parens patriae doctrine. 8
The District of Columbia has been one of the more liberal juris-
dictions in extending rights to the juvenile delinquent. In Shioutakon
v. District of Columbia,19 the court of appeals granted juveniles the
right to counsel in juvenile proceedings, and later extended this right
to the preliminary hearing on the question of waiver.20 The District
of Columbia has further regulated its waiver procedure by requiring
that there be a preliminary investigation and that counsel have access
to the minor's Social Service file.2' These decisions were reached
because the court felt, as it stated in Black v. United States, that due
process and "fundamental fairness" are of even greater importance in
waiver proceedings than in the usual juvenile case, since waiver
contemplates the potential imposition of criminal sanctions.22
crime); Ex parte Januszewski, 196 Fed. 123 (S.D. Ohio 1911) (state acts as guardian
saving children from conviction of crime); In re Sharp, 15 Idaho 120, 96 Pac. 563
(1908) (juvenile statute not penal but parental in nature); Marlowe v. Commonwealth,
142 Ky. 106, 133 S.W. 1137 (1911) (commitment for minor's protection not punish-
ment); Bryant v. Brown, 151 Miss. 398, 118 So. 184 (1928) (proceeding civil not
criminal); Commonwealth v. Fisher, 23 Pa. 48, 62 AtI. 198 (1905) (juvenile proceeding
is for protection of delinquent child); Childress v. State, 133 Tenn. 121, 179 S.W. 643
(1915) (purpose of proceeding is to protect child); In re Johnson, 173 Wis. 571, 181
N.W. 741 (1921) (exercise of police power of state for protection of child).
15. Thomas v. United States, supra note 8; People v. Dotson, supra note 10; Cinque
v. Boyd, supra note 8. Rule v. Geddes, 23 App. D.C. 31 (Ct. App. 1904). The
parens patriae has been criticized seriously by many authorities. "While the juvenile
court law provides that adjudication of a minor to be a ward of the court shall not be
deemed to be a conviction of crime, nevertheless, for all practical purposes, this is a
legal fiction, presenting a challenge to credulity and doing violence to reason." In re
Contreras, supra note 10, at 789, 241 P.2d at 633. See In re Holmes, supra note 8, at
610, 109 A.2d at 528 (dissenting opinion).
16. D.C. CODE ANN. § 11-907, now § 11-551 (Supp. V, 1966); CoNN. GEN. STAT.
ANN. § 17-59 (1958); GA. CODE ANN. § 24-2408 (1959); Ky. REV. STAT. ANN. §
208.020 (1963); ME. REv. STAT. ANN. ch. 403 § 2551 (1964); N.H. REV. STAT.
ANN. § 169:29 (1964); N.J. REV. STAT. § 2A:4-14 (1952); N.D. CENT. CODE § 27-16-08
(1960); R.I. GEN. LAWs ANN. § 14-1-5 (1956).
17. E.g., D.C. CODE § 11-914 (1961), now § 11-1553 (Supp. V, 1966; ME.
REV. STAT. ANN. ch. 403 § 2554 (1964); N.H. REv. STAT. ANN. § 169:29 (1964).
18. Watkins v. United States, 343 F.2d 278, 282 (D.C. Cir. 1964); Green v.
United States, 308 F.2d 303, 305 (D.C. Cir. 1962) (waiver of jurisdiction also judicial
finding of probable cause); In re Smith, 326 P.2d 835, 840 (Okla. Crim. App. 1958).
19. 236 F.2d 666 (D.C. Cir. 1956).
20. Black v. United States, 355 F.2d 104, 106 (D.C. Cir. 1965).
21. Watkins v. United States, supra note 18.
22. Black v. United States, supra note 20, at 106.
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Underlying the Court's decision in the instant case was the "critical"
importance of the waiver proceeding to the juvenile, since a determi-
nation of waiver anticipates the transfer of the case to a criminal
setting. Moreover, the "spirit" of the juvenile act in providing the
youth with special care and guidance was inconsistent with the
juvenile court's disregard of the defendant's request for a hearing and
access to the files used by the court in reaching its decision to waive
jurisdiction. The majority found that there was no place in the
juvenile court system for reaching a result of such consequence with-
out a hearing, and they added the additional stipulations that effective
assistance of counsel required access to the youth's Social Service file,
and that meaningful review necessitated a statement of the judge's
reasons for his decision. Since these procedural defects with respect
to the critical determination of waiver of jurisdiction had deprived
the defendant of the benefits which the parens patriae philosophy
should afford a young offender, the Court remanded the case. It
specifically refused to decide whether all constitutional rights appli-
cable in a criminal trial are equally applicable in a juvenile proceeding
or whether the hearing must meet the standards of a criminal or
administrative proceeding.23
Generally, a juvenile judge has wide discretion in determining the
rights of a juvenile offender, the procedure to be followed, and the
factors to be considered in determining the appropriate sanction. The
instant case's requirement that the essentials of due process and
"fundamental fairness" be afforded the juvenile limits this discretion.
24
However, the failure to specify what basic individual rights are to
be included within this vague standard of "fairness" considerably
restricts the import of this decision.2 At most, the Court has merely
laid a groundwork from which it can later formulate concrete proce-
dural requirements. Furthermore, since the majority relied heavily
upon the wording and spirit of the particular statute involved, the
case may be limited to the District of Columbia and thus be only
persuasive authority in other jurisdictions. It is significant to note,
however, that, in granting certiorari, the Supreme Court for the first
time expressed a tangible interest in the juvenile court system. It
may be that the Court will eventually require that the juvenile be
afforded all the safeguards applicable to an adult in a criminal proceed-
ing in order to assure "fundamental fairness." The effect of this would
be to abandon the non-adversarial proceeding in favor of an adversa-
23. 383 U.S. at 562.
24. See Handler, The Juvenile Court and the Adversanj System, 1965 Wis. L. Rlnv. 1.
25. Paulson, Fairness to the Juvenile Offender, 41 MINN. L. REv. 547 (1957) presents
an excellent discussion of rights which would not be inconsistent with the parens
patriae doctrine.
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rial one and to impair the rehabilitative purpose underlying the
juvenile court system. On the other hand, recognizing the philosophy
behind the juvenile court acts, the Court might simply preserve the
status quo. However, this would not remedy the injustice which often
results from inadequate administration in the juvenile courts. Between
these two extremes lies the third possibility of preserving the non-
adversarial nature of juvenile proceedings and still guaranteeing the
youth certain basic rights now available to adults in criminal pro-
ceedings. Rights, such as the right to counsel, right to a hearing,
and the right to confront witnesses, would protect the juvenile from a
capricious determination of his case but would not detract from a
parental atmosphere. Although it is presently impossible to determine
how this vague standard will be further defined, the Justices may have
an opportunity to clarify their position in the instant case in In re
Gault,6 a recent Arizona decision in which they noted probable
jurisdiction.27 In the final analysis, however, it may be that the
Supreme Court was justified in not laying down specific standards,
since the basic interests served by the parens patriae theory are those
of the social state as well as those of the juvenile, and the problem
may thus be better handled by the state legislature.
Labor Law-Public Carrier Can Make Unnegotiated
Unilateral Changes in Collective Agreements
When "Reasonably Necessary" To Maintain Service
Employees of defendant, Florida East Coast Railway, went on strike1
after negotiations under the Railway Labor Act2 failed to settle a wage
dispute.3 The defendant resumed partial operations soon thereafter by
employing a substantially different labor force under individual con-
26. 99 Ariz. 181, 407 P.2d 760 (1965).
27. In re Gault, 384 U.S. 997 (1966).
1. The non-operating unions struck the Florida East Coast Railway [hereinafter re-
ferred to as FEC) after their demand for a wage increase was not met. The operating
unions honored the picket lines and would not return to work. Thus, in effect, both
unions had struck.
2. 44 Stat. 577 (1926), as amended, 45 U.S.C. §§ 151-60, 181-88 (1964) [hereinafter
referred to as RLA]. The amendment in 1936 was passed to include carriers by air. The
RLA specifies negotiation procedures which provide an opportunity for settlement with-
out disrupting carrier service. These procedures will be discussed in greater detail in
note 11 infra.
3. After negotiation procedures failed, the union was entitled to self-help. Generally
self-help for the union is the right to strike. Pan American World Airways v. Flight
Eng'rs Int'l Ass'n, 306 F.2d 840 (2d Cir. 1962).
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tracts. These contracts differed significantly from the collective bar-
gaining agreements with respect to pay rates, working rules and
working conditions. The district court enjoined such unilateral
changes 4 as violations of the Railway Labor Act, but permitted the
Florida East Coast Railway to make temporary changes "reasonably
necessary" to maintain service.5 The Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals6
upheld the district court, and on certiorari7 to the United States Su-
preme Court, held, affirmed. After exhaustion of all applicable negotia-
tion procedures under the Railway Labor Act, a carrier covered by
this act,8 who is faced with a strike due to a good-faith bargaining
deadlock may institute such temporary unilateral changes as are reason-
ably necessary for the maintainance of services, even though these
changes have not been discussed during the negotiation proceedings.
Brotherhood of Ry. & S.S. Clerks v. Florida East Coast Ry., 384 U.S.
238 (1966).
Railway Labor Act disputes are classified as either "major" or
"minor." Where a party seeks to change a term of an existing collec-
tive bargaining agreement, the dispute is classified as a major one.
4. Unilateral changes by the company are departures from the existing collective
bargaining agreements without agreement with the union. If these changes affect the
rates of pay, rules, or working conditions, then they must be negotiated under the
RLA negotiation procedures. Thus, one must carefully distinguish changes which affect
these various areas from those which do not. Brotherhood of Ry. & S.S. Clerks v.
Southern Ry., 341 F.2d 217 (5th Cir. 1965).
5. In a concurrent suit against the FEC the Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals enunciated
the principle that although the FEC could not abrogate the existing collective bargaining
agreement, it could make changes as were "reasonably necessary" to operate under
strike conditions. Florida E.C. Ry. v. Brotherhood of Ry. Trainmen, 336 F.2d 172 (5th
Cir. 1964). The district court in the Trainmen's case and this case applied the principles
laid down in the Trainmen's case and allowed some departures which were "reasonably
necessary." Florida E.C. Ry. v. United States, 348 F.2d 682, 684 (5th Cir. 1965).
6. Florida E.C. Ry. v. United States, 348 F.2d 682 (5th Cir. 1965).
7. Brotherhood of Ry. & S.S. Clerks v. Florida E.C. Ry., 382 U.S. 1008 (1966).
8. Carriers by railroad which are covered by this act are those railroads which are
subject to the Interstate Commerce Act or any company which is owned or controlled
by such -a railroad and which performs services for such transportation. Street, in-
terurban, or suburban electric railroads are not covered by this act unless they are an
operating part of a system which is covered by the act. Carriers by air which are
covered are those which engage in interstate commerce or are under government con-
tract to carry mail. The employees of all carriers covered by this act are also covered.
Railway Labor Act § I First, 44 Stat. 577 (1926), 45 U.S.C. § 151 First (1964),
as amended, § 201, 49 Stat. 1189 (1936), 45 U.S.C. § 181 (1964).
9. Elgin, J. & E. Ry. v. Burley, 325 U.S. 723, 725 (1945). Accord, Elgin, J. & E. Ry.
v. Brotherhood of R.R. Trainmen, 196 F. Supp. 158 (D.C. 1. 1961), aff'd, 302 F.2d
540 .(7th Cir.), cert. denied, 371 U.S. 823 (1962) (union desire for changes in a
pension plan held a major dispute). A minor dispute arises in relation to the meaning
or application of such agreement to a specific situation. Elgin, J. & E. Ry. v. Burley,
supra. Accord, Brotherhood of Locomotive Eng'rs. v. Louisville & N. R.R., 373 U.S.
33 (1963), holding that a dispute over a time lost award was a minor dispute as it
involved the interpretation and application of the collective agreement between the
union and the railroad. Under the "minor" dispute procedures compulsory arbitration
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This means that the management's prerogatives are-limited by section
2, Seventh, of the act, which provides: "No-carrier, its officers, or
agents shall change the rates of pay, rules, or working conditions of
its employees, as a class, as embodied in the agreements except in the
manner prescribed in such agreements or in section 6 of this Act."10
Section 6 requires that railroads follow the negotiation procedures set
out in the act for settling major disputes." If such procedures are
exhausted without settlement the parties may resort to self-help. 12 Al-
is provided for. Railway Labor Act § 3, First (i) and (m), 44 Stat. 578 (1926), as
amended, 45 U.S.C. § 153 First (i) and (m) (1964).
10. Railway Labor Act § 2 Seventh, 48 Stat. 1188 (1934), as amended, 45 U.S.C.
§ 152 Seventh (1964).
11. Section 6 of the RLA, 44 Stat. 582 (1926), as amended, 45 U.S.C. § 156 (1964),
requires, in a major dispute, that the party desiring a change in the collective agreements
must give the other party a 30-day notice (called a § 6 notice). Within ten days upon
receipt of the notice, the time and place of conference between the parties interested
therein must be agreed upon. If these conferences fail to settle the dispute, the Na-
tional Mediation Board (NMB) may proffer, or may be asked by either party, to
render its services. In either case the parties must accept. If the NMB fails to settle
the dispute, the parties may resort to self-help subject only to the limitations of either
the creation of a Presidential Emergency Board (as provided for in Railway Labor Act
§ 10, 44 Stat. 586-87 (1926), as amended, 45 U.S.C. § 160 (1964), or action by
Congress. If the President invokes the Emergency Board, the Board will make recom-
mendations to the President, but these will not be binding upon the parties. If Congress
acts it may require compulsory arbitration which is not provided for in the RLA (for
example, in 1963 Congress passed Public Law 88-108, 77 Stat. 132, which pro-
vided for compulsory arbitration). In each of the RLA negotiation procedures - con-
ferences, mediation, and the Emergency Board - two conditions are attached. First,
the parties must bargain in good faith. Good faith has been defined as the absence of
bad faith. To prove bad faith a party must show that the other party entered into
negotiations with the intention of never coming to an agreement. Brotherhood of Ry.
& S.S. Clerks, Freight Handlers & Station Employees v. Atlantic C.L. R.R., 201 F.2d
36 (4th Cir. 1953). American Airlines, Inc. v. Air Line Pilots Int'l Ass'n, 169 F. Supp.
777 (S.D.N.Y. 1958). For a more complete description of good faith see Cox, The
Duty to Bargain In Good Faith, 71 HA.v. L. REv. 1401 (1958). Second, the parties
must maintain the status quo while the negotiation procedures are active. Florida E.C.
Ry. v. Brotherhood of By. Trainmen, 336 F.2d 172 (5th Cir. 1964), cert. denied, 379
U.S. 990 (1965). Railway Labor Act § 6, 44 Stat. 582 (1926), as amended, 45 U.S.C.
§ 156 (1964). If the parties violate the Act they may be enjoined from committing
such violations. Railway Labor Act § 2 Tenth, 48 Stat. 1189 (1934), as amended, 45
U.S.C. § 152 Tenth (1964).
12. The idea of self-help is indicated in the BLA, in conjunction with the "cooling
off" periods. Railway Labor Act § 5, 44 Stat. 580 (1926), 45 U.S.C. § 155 (1964),
provides that if the NMB fails and arbitration is refused (voluntary arbitration being
provided for in Railway Labor Act § 7, 44 Stat. 582 (1926), 45 U.S.C. § 157 (1964)),
"no change shall be made in the rates of pay, rules or working conditions or established
practices prior to the time the dispute arose . . ." until 30 days after the NMB discon-
tinues services. Railway Labor Act § 6, 44 Stat. 582 (1926), 45 U.S.C. § 156 (1964),
provides that changes cannot be made in rates of pay, rules, or working conditions after
the conferences unless 10 days has elapsed since their conclusion and the NMB has not
proffered, and the parties have not asked for, its services. Railway Labor Act § 10, 44
Stat. 586 (1926), 45 U.S.C. § 160 (1964), provides that no change shall be made
except by agreement between the parties "in the conditions out of which the dispute
arose . . ." until 30 days after the Presidential Board has made its report. These sec-
tions indicate that while each section is in operation, and for the designated period,
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though self-help has never been defined in a concise statement,13 it is
generally understood to mean the unilateral exercise of economic force
after the legal processes have failed to secure a settlement. 14 Its pur-
pose is to allow the carrier to exercise its right to continue operations
and to coerce the opposing disputant to reach a settlement. For ex-
ample, after exhaustion of the negotiation procedures under the Rail-
way Labor Act, the carrier may either put into effect the changes
proposed at the bargaining table, 15 or threaten individual strikers with
replacement if they refuse offers for retraining.16 Essentially, the
remedy of self-help allows the "free-play" of the forces involved in
order to reach a voluntary agreement. To avoid indefinite postpone-
ment of the use of this remedy, courts refuse to allow the parties to
invoke the negotiation procedures a second time by merely raising new
issues.1
7
afterwards, no unilateral changes shall be made. After these "cooling off" periods have
expired, the parties may resort to self-help to settle the dispute. Brotherhood of
Locomotive Eng'rs v. Baltimore & 0. R.R., 372 U.S. 284 (1963).
13. Self-help has rarely been defined since labor disputes under the RLA are
normally resolved before the self-help device becomes available.
14. In comparison, self-help under the National Labor Relations Act (Wagner Act),
49 Stat. 449 (1935), as amended, Labor Management Relations Act (Taft-Harley Act),
61 Stat. 136 (1947), as amended, Labor-Management Reporting and Disclosure Act
(Landrum-Griflfin Act), 73 Stat. 519 (1959), 29 U.S.C. §§ 141-88 (1964), has been
more fully defined. It must be remembered that under the NLRA these unilateral
changes, which have been termed self-help devices, are discussed in terms of unfair
labor practices. For example, in NLRB v. Erie Resistor Corp., 380 U.S. 300 (1965),
the Court held that "super-seniority" was an unfair labor practice. But it is similar to
self-help under the RLA, since it deals with the company's ability to bring good-faith
economic pressure on the union in order to break the strike. The reason for citing the
NLRA cases is to indicate in what direction and in what manner the Supreme Court
may be heading in handling labor problems under the RLA. Several cases will ex-
emplify self-help under the NLRA: American Ship Bldg. Co. v. NLRB, 380 U.S. 300
(1965) (temporary lock-out of employees of single employer permissible); NLRB v.
Truck Drivers Union, 353 U.S. 87 (1957) (lock-out permissible in whipsaw strike);
Robinson Freight Lines, 144 N.L.R.B. 1093 (1955), enforcement granted, NLRB v.
Robinson, 251 F.2d 639 (6th Cir. 1958) (threatening workers with replacement if
they did not return to work); NLRB v. Mackay Radio & Tel. Co., 304 U.S. 333 (1938)
(replacing permanently economic strikers). Self-help under the NLRA does not in-
clude either, "super-seniority" for replacements, NLRB v. Erie Resistor Corp., 373
U.S. 221 (1963), or instituting unilateral changes substantially different from those
proposed at the bargaining table, NLRB v. Crompton-Higbland Mills, Inc., 337 U.S.
217 (1949).
15. Brotherhood of Locomotive Eng'rs v. Baltimore & 0. R.R., 372 U.S. 284 (1963),
indicated that self-help may be instituted only after the use of the required RLA
negotiation procedures.
16. Flight Eng'rs Int'l Ass'n, -AL Chapter v. Eastern Airlines, 208 F. Supp. 182
(S.D.N.Y.), aff'd, 307 F.2d 510 (1962), cert. denied, 372 U.S. 945 (1963) (these
tactics were reasonable efforts to persuade all of Eastern's employees to return to work).
17. American Airlines v. Airlines Pilots Ass'n Int'l, 169 F. Supp. 777 (S.D.N.Y.
1958); Northwest Airlines Inc. v. Airline Pilots Ass'n Intl, 185 F. Supp. 77 (D. Minn.
1960); Pittsburgh & L.E. R.R. v. Brotherhood of Ry. Trainmen, -79 F. Supp. 271 (W.D.
Penn. 1959); Pan American World Airlines v. Flight Eng'rs Int'l Ass'n, 306 F.2d 840
(2d Cir. 1962), all held that RLA negotiation procedures could not be commenced
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In the instant case, the Supreme Court not only refused to permit the
union to set the Railway Labor Act negotiation procedures into motion
again, but also allowed the railroad to effectuate unilateral changes
which were "reasonably necessary" to maintain services despite non-
compliance with the negotiation procedures. 18 The Court specifically
allowed the railroad to "exceed the ratio of apprentices to journeymen
and age limitations established by the collective agreements to contract
out certain work and to use supervisory personnel to perform certain
specified jobs where it appeared that trained personnel were unavail-
able."19 The majority felt this temporary permission was necessary for
three reasons. First, the railroad's responsibility to the public required
that it use reasonable efforts20 to continue service, since a lack of rail-
road service might curtail the distribution of vital products and ser-
vices to the area involved. Second, if each of the unilateral changes
had to be approved through the purposefully long and involved ne-
gotiation procedures, self-help would be effectively available only to
the union.2 1 Third, the denial of self-help would halt railroad opera-
tions because the railroad would have neither union nor replacement
personnel with whom to operate. The Court, however, cautioned that
unilateral changes made without compliance with the negotiation pro-
cedures must be strictly limited and temporary in nature. It felt that
if an employer could easily avoid collective agreements during a strike,
labor-management relations would be chaotic and collective bargaining
agreements would be meaningless. Mr. Justice White dissented, argu-
ing that these unilateral changes should not be made even with the
consent of the courts, since the Railway Labor Act does not so pro-
vide.z2
again by a party, merely by serving a § 6 notice raising new issues.
18. Brotherhood of Ry. & S.S. Clerks v. Florida E.C. Ry., 384 U.S. 238 (1966).
The company was allowed to make unilateral changes without going through the BLA
negotiation procedures which are normally required before unilateral changes may be
invoked.
19. Id. at 245. The district court denied FEC's request to: (1) completely disregard
craft and seniority district restrictions; (2) use supervisors to perform craft work at
any time; (3) be relieved of the duty to provide seniority rosters; (4) contract out
work whenever trained personnel was unavailable; (5) void the union shop with
respect to replacement personnel.
20. Id. at 244-45. The language used by the Court is similar to that in Railway
Labor Act § 2 First, 44 Stat. 577 (1926), as amended, 45 U.S.C. § 152 First (1964).
21. If § 2 Seventh, of the act were applicable after a strike, the railroad would have
to maintain the status quo as required. The railroad would be unable to use replace-
ment personnel under either the collective agreements since it would not be feasible
or the individual contracts since these would not be allowed by § 2 Seventh. Thus, the
railroad could not exercise its right to self-help - unilateral use of economic force;
whereas the union would have already exercised its right to self-help - the strike.
22. In addition, Mr. Justice White felt Congress had not contemplated this type of
"receivership," particularly since its effect was to 'facilitate the avoidance of ,RLA.
negotiation pgodedure requirements. Finally, since Congress did not provide for com-
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While the Supreme Court has remained within the purposes of the
Railway Labor Act by keeping the defendant railroad operating,3 in
so doing, it has abandoned its practice of avoiding direct involvement
in resolving union-management disputes over working conditions. In
promulgating the act, Congress sought to avoid compulsory arbitra-
tion; yet a single party can now force the court into the role of tempor-
ary arbiter in this situation.? Thus, the effect of the instant decision
is to allow the courts to aid companies in avoiding the most severe
consequence of a union strike,2- that is, the prolonged shutdown. How-
ever, the public interest may justify this judicial intervention, even in
the face of the nearly unequivocal language of section 2, Seventh,2
if the district courts will heed the Supreme Court's admonition to
construe strictly what are "reasonably necessary" changes. Judicious
employment of the unnegotiated unilateral change device will allow
both the public interest and the goals of the act to be served. The
instant Court utilizes this device to balance more equitably the eco-
nomic power of the parties in a suit under the Railway Labor Act in
a manner similar to that employed in recent National Labor Relations
Board decisions. The district courts will largely determine whether
this case will be a stepping-stone to an expansion of self-help in Rail-
pulsory arbitration, they had not anticipated that the court's aid could be invoked to
enforce unilateral changes. 384 U.S. at 248-50.
23. Railway Labor Act § 1(a), 44 Stat. 577 (1926), as amended, 45 U.S.C. § 151a
(1964). which sets out the purposes of the act. The first purpose is to avoid any
interruption in commerce.
24. The court would be a temporary arbiter in that it would either grant the re-
quests of the company or deny them. This granting or denying is the function of the
arbiter in the typical arbitration case. It must be noted that the Supreme Court itself
has stated: "No authority is empowered to decide the dispute and no such power is
intended, unless the parties themselves agree to arbitration." Elgin, J. & E. R.R. v.
Burley, 325 U.S. 723, 725 (1945).
25. Another form of self-help occurred in 1958 when the Civil Aeronautics Board
approved the "mutual aid pact" between six major airlines which applied to any strike
except those in which the carrier violated the RLA or refused to settle on basis of the
Presidential recommendations. Each party to the pact had to pay an amount equal to
its net income from strike-diverted traffle to the struck carrier. CAB Order Nos.
E-13233 and E-13308 (1958). Another situation is the government subsidy of airline
losses. It has been held that the Board should not determine whether strike losses
should be included or excluded as such, but rather should determine the inclusion or
exclusion on the basis of statutory and judicial tests already existing. American Overseas
Airlines v. Civil Aeronautics Bd., 254 F.2d 744 (D.C. Cir. 1958). Therefore, it is possi-
ble that the government would subsidize airline losses due to a strike. Thus, if strike
losses are subsidized and self-help in the present form could be invoked, the carrier could
avoid the more severe consequences of a strike.
26. See note 10 supra and accompanying text.
27. See note 14 supra and cases cited therein. In comparing these cases with the
instant case, similarity can be noted in the process of arriving at a result. In all of the
cases, the court balances the economic interest of the parties involved so that it may
more nearly equate the countervailing powers of the union and the company. For a
more detailed discussion of this balancing aspect see Schatzki, The Employer's Uni.
lateral Act - A Per Se Violation - Sometimes, 44 TExAs L. REv. 470 (1966).
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way Labor Act disputes paralleling that experienced under the Na-
tional Labor Relations Act.2 In determining what unnegotiated
unilateral changes are "reasonably necessary," the district courts must
consider the interests of-the company, the union, Congress, and the
paramount interest of the public in the continuance of service. They
must analyze the factual situation of each party to determine what is
"reasonably necessary" to maintain railroad operations without de-
stroying the economic balance between the union and the railroad
and without violating the spirit of the Railway Labor Act. It appears
unlikely that this expanded concept of self-help will be extended into
other areas, because it is unusual for the public interest to be so in-
tegrally involved. However, the Supreme Court may reach the same
result in other public service cases if negotiation procedures have
failed, the union has struck, the economic balance between the parties
needs modifying, the company can continue service with minimal re-
visions of existing agreements and the public interest is significantly
involved. -. .. ... ..
Labor Law-In Future NLRB Elections, Employer
Must Furnish List of Employees' Names
and Addresses
During campaigns preceeding two elections conducted by the Na-
tional Labor Relations Board, employers mailed letters containing anti-
union material to their employees, but denied the unions' request for a
list of the employees' names and addresses. After losing the elections,
the unions claimed that although the employers' refusal was not an un-
fair labor practice,1 the Board should, nevertheless, set aside the elec-
tions because of employer interference in refusing to furnish the re-
quested list. The Board, however, certified the elections upon the
recommendations of the regional directors; but announced that all
future NLRB elections' would be invalidated unless the employer filed
the names and addresses of the eligible voters with the regional di-
28. See note 14 supra.
1. National Labor Relations Act § 8(a) (1), 49 Stat. 453 (1935), as amended 29
U.S.C. § 158 (1964): "It shall be an unfair labor practice for an employer - (1) To
interfere with, restrain, or coerce employees in the exercise of the rights guaranteed in
section 7'." National Labor Relations Act § 7, 49 Stat. 452 (1935), as amended, 29
U.S.C. § 157 (1964): "Employees shall have the right to self-organization, to form,
join or assist labor organizations, to bargain collectively .....
2. The rule does not apply to expedited elections conducted pursuant to § 8 (b) (7)
(c) of the act. However, this is the only exception.
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rector who would make this information available to all parties con-
cerned.3 Excelsior Underwear, Inc., CCH LAB. L. REP. If 20180
(NLRB Feb. 4, 1966).
The particular holding of the instant case is directly in line with
prior Board policy.4 Its significance lies in the effect the Board's new
rule will have upon the solicitation and distribution of campaign ma-
terial during an NLRB election campaign. In the past, the Board has
imposed other procedural election requirements5 under its broad power
to control election proceedings and to see that the elections are con-
ducted fairly.6 The Board has stated that its function in this connec-
tion is "to provide a laboratory in which an experiment may be
conducted, under conditions as nearly ideal as possible, to determine
the uninhibited desires of the employees."7 It has been said that these
laboratory conditions can best be achieved by insuring that "the ave-
nues of communication" are kept open to both sides.8 There has been
considerable controversy, however, as to how these concepts should ap-
3. The rule was stated as follows: "[W]ithin 7 days after the Regional Director
has approved a consent election agreement . . . or has directed an election . . . the
employer must file with the Regional Director an election eligibility list, containing the
names and addresses of all the eligible voters. The Regional Director, in turn, shall
make this information available to all parties in the case. Failure to comply with this
requirement shall be grounds for setting aside the election whenever proper objections
are fied." Excelsior Underwear Inc., CCH LA. L. REP. ff 20180, at 25403-04 (NLRB
Feb. 4, 1966).
4. In the past, the Board has refused to set aside an election on the ground that the
employer did not furnish the union with a list of the names and addresses of the
employees. It has required the filing of an eligibility list containing the names of all
employees eligible to vote in the NLRB election, but this filing could be delayed until
immediately before the election date and was thus of little benefit during the campaign.
5. See, e.g., Peerless Plywood Co., 107 N.L.R.B. 427 (1953). In that case the Board
formed a rule prohibiting unions and employers from making election speeches on
company time to employees within 24 hours before the scheduled time for the election.
See also Higgins, Ific., 106 N.L.R.B. 845 (1953) (use of sound trucks prohibited).
6. NLRB v. Waterman S.S. Corp., 309 U.S. 206 (1940). The Supreme Court upheld
a Board order which had been reversed by the Fifth Circuit as based on mere suspicion.
The Board had found, among other things, that the employer had interfered with an
election directed by the Board. In the course of its opinion, the Court stated: "the
control of the election proceeding, and the determination of the steps necessary to con-
duct that election fairly were matters which Congress entrusted to the Board alone."
Id. at 226.
7. General Shoe Corp., 77 N.L.R.B. 124, 127 (1948). The Board held that where
the employees' freedom of choice was impaired, the election might be set aside even
though the conduct in issue did not amount to an unfair labor practice. This argument
is still valid today, Dal-Tex Optical Co., 137 N.L.R.B. 1782 (1962), and could have
important effects upon the application of the Board's new rule. See, e.g., note 27
infra and accompanying text.
8. Bonwit Teller, Inc. v. NLRB, 197 F.2d 640, 646 (2d Cir. 1952), cert. denied,
345 U.S. 905 (1953). The particular holding in this case has been severely limited
by later decisions. However, the basic idea of assuring freedom of communication still
appeals to the Board and the courts as the best means of maintaining the required
"laboratory conditions." For a view that other means should be considered, see Gould,
Union Activity on Company Property, 18 VAND. L. REv. 73, 85 (1964).
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ply in particular situations. Problems usually arise when union organ-
izers or pro-union employees attempt to use company premises to
distribute material or to solicit employees' votes in personal conversa-
tions. The problem of oral solicitation has been distinguished by some
from that of distribution of materials;9 but while the two leading cases
in the area concerned distribution problems, both spoke in general
terms of "solicitation" without making such a distinction.10 The Board's
current position on oral solicitation appears in Livingston Shirt,"
where it stated: "In the absence of either an unlawful broad no-solici-
tation rule (prohibiting union access to company premises on other
than working time) or a privileged no-solicitation rule (broad, but not
unlawful because of the character of the business) an employer does
not commit an unfair labor practice if he makes a pre-election speech
on company time and premises to his employees and denies the union's
request for an opportunity to reply." 2 The general principles govern-
ing solicitation and distribution of campaign material on company
property were enunciated in two Supreme Court cases. In NLRB V.
Babcock & Wilcox Co.,'3 the Court stated that an employer did not
commit an unfair labor practice by maintaining a no-solicitation rule
which precluded distribution on his premises by nonemployees 4 so
long as there was no discrimination in the rule's application and the
union, through reasonable efforts, could reach the employees through
other available channels of communication. Two years later the Court
decided NLRB v. United Steelworkers,5 involving union charges that
the companies' no-distribution rules, when viewed in conjunction with
the presence of other unfair labor practices, constituted unfair labor
9. See Bok, The Regulation of Campaign Tactics in Representative Elections Under
the National Labor Relations Act, 78 HAv. L. REV. 38, 93 i(1964).
10. NLRB v. United Steelworkers, 357 U.S. 357 (1958); NLRB v. Babcock & Wilcox
Co., 351 U.S. 105 (1956). Thus the relation of these cases to problems involving oral
solicitation is not yet clear. The distinction between oral solicitation and distribution
was made by the Board, however, in Stoddard-Quirk Mfg. Co., 138 N.L.R.B. 615 (1962).
11. 107 N.L.R.B. 400 (1953).
12. Id. at 409.
13. Supra note 10.
14. Generally, a no-solicitation rule which interferes with the right of employees to
solicit on nonworking time violates § 8(a) (1) of the act, and is an unfair labor prac-
tice. See Republic Aviation Corp. v. NLRB, 324 U.S. 793 (1945). However, depart-
ment stores have long been exempted from the application of this rule because the
nature of the business is such that solicitation, in selling areas, even on nonworking
time, would unduly interfere with the retail store operations. See, e.g., Marshall Field
& Co. 98 N.L.R.B. 88 (1952). See also Stoddard-Quirk Mfg. Co., supra note 10, where
the Board decided that even though under Babcock nonemployees might be barred
from distributing literature on the employer's plant, employees could not be so restricted.
The Board held that the company might properly. exclude all distribution by anyone
in the working areas of the plant, but employees must be permitted to solicit in non-
w9rking areas on their own time.
15. Supra note 10.
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practices. The Court rejected the union charges on the grounds that no
request was made to relax the rules and that no attempt was made to
show the Court that the no-solicitation rules truly diminished the
union's ability to reach the employees. The Court then stated: "If, by
virtue of the location of the plant and of the facilities and resources
available to the union, the opportunities for effectively reaching the
employees with a pro-union message, in spite of a no-solicitation rule,
are at least as great as the employer's ability to promote the legally
authorized expression of his anti-union views, there is no basis for in-
validating these 'otherwise valid' rules."16 The ramifications of the
Court's emphasis on the availability of other channels of communica-
tion as a basis for determining the significance of the employer's
conduct are as yet undetermined, particularly since distribution and
oral solicitation were not clearly distinguished in either Babcock or
Steelworkers.17 In May Department Stores Co., 8 for example, the
Sixth Circuit rejected the per se approach of Livingston Shirt on the
ground that Steelworkers required the Board to consider the other
channels of communication available to the union even where the em-
ployer maintained a legally broad no-solicitation rule and had made a
non-coercive antiunion speech on company time and premises, refusing
to allow the union an opportunity to reply. The Board has since voiced
disagreement with the Sixth Circuit's interpretation of Steelworkers,
however,19 and it is in this limited area that the Excelsior rule may have
the most significant impact.
In Excelsior the Board felt that in the absence of employer dis-
closure of its employees' names and addresses, the union would not be
able to present its side to the voters because of the practical difficulties
involved in disseminating such information.20 Since the Board's duty
was to conduct elections free from elements impeding a free and rea-
soned choice, and since a lack of information concerning one side of
16. NLRB v. United Steelworkers, supra note 10, at 364.
17. E.g., in Steelworkers one of the union objections centered around the oral solici-
tation of employees by the company's supervisory personnel. Confusion as to the exact
implications of this holding have precipitated the controversy between the Board and
the Sixth Circuit discussed at note 18 infra and accompanying text.
18. 136 N.L.R.B. 797 (1962), enforcement denied, 316 F.2d 797 (6th Cir. 1963).
May involved a legally broad no-solicitation rule which, under Livingston Shirt, meant
that the employer committed an unfair labor practice per se if he made a noncoercivo
antiunion speech on company time and refused to allow the union to use the premises
to reply. The Sixth Circuit rejected this per se approach, however.
19. The Board "respectfully disagreed" with the Sixth Circuit's interpretation of
Steelworkers, and reafrmed its May decision in Montgomery Ward & Co., 145 N.L.R.B.
846 (1964), enforced as modified, 339 F.2d 889 (6th Cir. 1965), which the Sixth
Circuit enforced as modified after carefully distinguishing May by finding in Mont-
gomery Ward an illegally broad no-solicitation rule and other unfair labor practices.
See also S & H Grossinger's Inc., CCH LAB. L. RS'. II 20100 (NLRB Dec. 21, 1965).
20. Excelsior Underwear, supra note 3, at 25405 & n.11.
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the issue necessarily impeded such a choice, the Board announced the
rule requiring disclosure by the employer in all future NLRB elections.
The employers urged that Babcock and Steelworkers required that the
Board consider the alternative channels of communication available
to the unions before issuing the rule. These two cases were distin-
guished, however, on the ground that they were concerned with unfair
labor practices rather than the validity of a NLRB election. Further-
more, they required consideration of alternative channels of communi-
cation only where the opportunity to communicate, as made available
by the Board, interfered with a significant employer interest-such as
controlling the use of his own property. The Board concluded that the
"employer has no significant interest in the secrecy of employee names
and addresses,"2' and thus it did not feel compelled to investigate
alternative channels of communication. It decided to apply the rule
prospectively, however, and certified the instant elections on the
ground that the particular facts did not warrant setting them aside.22
This rule reflects the Board's attempt to insure a realistic opportunity
for both sides to present their arguments to all the eligible voters in an
NLRB election.23 On the one hand, it has the significant effect of pre-
serving the most effective forum for the employer. He alone can
utilize the emotion-packed speech at the company plant on company
time, a political device far more effective than the mere mailing of a
letter to an employee's home. On the other hand, the unions, in addi-
tion to solicitation by mail, will be able to solicit the employees person-
ally in their homes, a practice forbidden employers24 and not always
possible for unions before Excelsior, since employees' addresses were
not readily available. 25 The extent of the unions' advantage in this area,
however, will depend upon whether such factors as the number of
employees and the distances they live from the plant render extensive
21. Id. at 25407.
22. On the day Excelsior was handed down, the Board also decided General Electric,
CCH LAB. L. R P,. II 20181 (NLRB Feb. 4, 1966), which involved union objections
to employer conduct prior to an NLRB election. The employers bad denied a union
request for an opportunity to reply to non-coercive speeches delivered on company time
and premises. The Board refused to reconsider its holding in Livingston Shirt until the
impact of the Excelsior rule had been evaluated, and, thus, certified the election.
23. Some means of securing this equality of opportunity is needed, but legal com-
mentators have differed over the means best suited to resolving the problem. The
Excelsior rule has been suggested by some as a possible means of allowing communica-
tion without encouraging numerous artificial and arbitrary rules regulating election con-
duct. Compare Bok, supra note 9, with Gould, supra note 8, at 102-03.
24. See, e.g., Peoria Plastic Go., 117 N.L.R.B. 545 (1957). -
25. The employers in the instant case argued that the privacy of the employees would
be invaded and that they might well be harrassed in their homes. The Board did not
feel, however, that the possibility of abuse of its rule by the unions warranted the re-
fusal to announce the rule. Also the Board indicated that relief would be provided if
the rule were abused.
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personal contact impractical. The Excelsior rule may also have an
important effect upon cases involving oral solicitation of the type
formerly proscribed under Livingston Shirt. Denial of a union's request
to reply to a noncoercive antiunion speech on company time made by
an employer who maintains a broad, but not unlawful, no-solicitation
rule and who has complied with the Board's new rule, would be an
unfair labor practice per se under Livingston Shirt.26 However, in light
of the Supreme Court's "avenues of communication" approach in Bab-
cock and Steelworkers, the courts may be persuaded that no unfair
labor practice was in fact committed since the union clearly had other
available channels of communication by virtue of the employer's com-
pliance with Excelsior's rule. Unless Babcock and Steelworkers are
to be limited to distribution situations, such a ruling would appear
correct even though it expressly contradicts Livingston Shirt. If the
Board could show that the union's opportunities for communication
were limited in spite of Excelsior, the Courts of Appeals would ap-
parently affirm, but such a showing would probably be quite difficult
given the nature of the rule.
The Board expressly refused to decide whether a violation of the rule
would be an unfair labor practice, but since the Board may set aside
an election because of conduct not amounting to an unfair labor prac-
tice,.2 7 an employer refusing to comply with the new rule will face at
least a new election.28 Should the Board adopt the position that a
violation of Excelsior will be upheld by the Courts of Appeals as an
courts may reverse on the ground that consideration of the other avail-
able channels of communication is required even when there is only a
small employer interest involved. However, since the purpose of the
Excelsior rule is to provide the union with the very avenues of com-
munication suggested by the Supreme Court, it is quite possible that a
violation of Excelsior will be upheld by the Courts of Appeals as an
unfair labor practice, if the Board so regards it.
26. See note 18 supra and accompanying text.
27. See, e.g., Dal-Tex Optical Co., supra note 7; General Shoe Corp., supra note 7.
For a criticism of the doctrine in General Shoe, see 38 N.Y.U.L. REv. 243, 274 (1963).
28. Excelsior Underwear Inc., supra note 3, at 25407.
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Taxation-Thin Incorporation Not Tantamount to
Disqualification From Subchapter S
Taxpayers incorporated Century House in 1959 to build and operate
a motel near the Seattle World's Fair. The corporation's authorized
capital stock was 500 shares of no-par value stock, and paid-in capital
was 500 dollars. The taxpayers each owned the same number of
shares. They intended to obtain 100 per cent permanent financing
from outside sources, but, because of the many tourist facilities being
constructed for the fair, this became impossible. Therefore, to meet
operating expenses between 1960-1962, taxpayers advanced over
252,000 dollars of their own money to the corporation, in approxi-
mately equal shares, in exchange for six per cent demand notes. At no
time was interest on these notes either paid or demanded, nor was any
effort made to enforce payment. In January, 1961, Century House
filed an election under subchapter S or the Code,' which allows share-
holders of electing small business corporations to deduct corporate net
operating losses on their individual income tax returns.' The Commis-
sioner ruled that, since subchapter S of the code expressly provides
that each electing small business corporation must possess only a
single class of stock, Century House could not qualify.3 In finding a
second class of stock, the Commissioner relied upon a regulation
which provided that any purported debt obligation which is in reality
equity capital, is a second class of stock per se.4 On review by the
Tax Court, held, a corporation's demand notes, given to secure ad-
vances made by stockholders, which are in reality contributions of
equity capital, do not constitute a second class of stock where these
notes do not give the stockholders rights and interests different from
1. INT. REV. CODE OF 1954, §§ 1371-78.
2. "A net operating loss of an electing small business corporation for any taxable
year shall be allowed as a deduction from gross income of the shareholders of such
corporation .... ." INT. REV. CODE OF 1954, § 1374(a). Relying upon this provision,
taxpayers claimed deductions for their pro rata shares of the corporation's net operating
losses for 1961 and 1962 on their individual tax returns for those years. The Com-
missioner disallowed the deductions.
3. "For purposes of this subchapter, the term 'small business corporation' means a
domestic corporation . . . which does not . . . (4) have more than one class of
stock." INT. REV. CODE OF 1954, § 1371(a) (4).
4. "A corporation having more than one class of stock does not qualify as a small
business corporation . . . . If the outstanding shares of stock of the corporation are
not identical with respect to the rights and interest which they convey in the control,
profits, and assets of the corporation, then the corporation is considered to have more
than one class of stock. Thus, a difference as to voting rights . . . or liquidation
preferences of outstanding stock will disqualify a corporation . . . . If an instrument
purporting to be a debt obligation is actually stock, it will constitute a second class of
stock." (Emphasis added.) Treas. Reg. § 1.1371-1(g) (1959), as amended, T.D. 6667,
1963-2 CuM. BuLL. 343.
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those possessed by the holders of the nominal stock. W.C. Gamman,
P-H TAX CT. REP. & MEm. DEc. I 46.1 (April 4, 1966).
Subchapter S was passed in 1958 for the purpose of allowing busi-
nessmen to select their organization form "without the necessity of
taking into account major differences in tax consequences."-, Qualify-
ing corporations retained certain corporate characteristics, 6 but were
to be treated like partnerships for purposes of taxation. The Code
expressly provides that an electing corporation cannot qualify for
subchapter S treatment if it has more than one class of stock.8 Since
the Commissioner's regulation9 declares any loan which is in reality
equity capital to be a second class of stock per se, closely held corpora-
tions might readily be disqualified from subchapter S treatment. This
is an extension of the "thin incorporation doctrine" into subchapter
S.10 Prior to Gamman only two cases applied the second class of stock
regulation, and neither case challenged its validity. In Catalina
Homes, Inc.,2 a shareholder advanced funds to the corporation in
return for five per cent demand notes on which interest was payable
"from time to time as determined by the Board of Directors." Divi-
dends of the corporation were not to be declared until the corporation's
debts were fully paid. In classifying these advances as equity capital
rather than debt, the court cited Isidor Dobkin1 3 for the proposition
that where a corporation arbitrarily designates a major portion of
necessary funds as loans, a strong inference arises that the entire
5. S. REP. No. 1983, 85th Cong., 2d Sess. 87 (1958). For a sharp criticism of
subchapter S, see Caplin, Subchapter S vs. Partntrship: A Proposed Legislative Program,
46 VA. L. REv. 61 (1960).
6. For a discussion of the private law advantages of the corporate form, see Strecker,
When Will the Corporate Form Save Taxes?, 18 VAND. L. R'v. 1695, 1697 (1965).
7. Id. at 1725.
8. INT. RFv. CODE OF 1954, § 1372(3).
9. Supra note 4.
10. Thin incorporation, for tax purposes, deals with the problem of whether advances
made by stockholders are legitimate debt obligations as opposed to equity capital
investments, subject to the risks of business. In order to avoid taxes on corporate
income, shareholders developed the practice of "lending" operating funds to the
corporation. The "interest" on these "loans" was deducted from corporate earnings,
thereby reducing the corporation's gross income and minimizing the corporate tax.
Since 1946 several different factors have influenced the courts in determining whether
an advance is debt or equity. Where the ratio of debt to equity was high the Supreme
Court ruled that the advances were equity. John Kelly Co. v. Commissioner, 326
U.S. 521 (1946); another test was the true intent of the parties, Rowan v. United
States, 219 F.2d 51 (5th Cir. 1955). For a thorough discussion of the problems
involved and proposed solutions to the debt-equity problem, compare Gilbert v. Commis-
sioner, 248 F.2d 399 (2d Cir. 1957), remanding 15 CCH Tax Ct. Mem. 688 (1956),
with O.H. Kruse Grain & Milling v. Commissioner, 279 F.2d 123 (9th Cir. 1960). See
also Caplin, The Caloric Count of a Thin Incorporation, N.Y.U. 17 INST. ON FED.
TAx 771 (1959).
11. Supra note 4.
12. 23 CCH Tax Ct. Mem. 1361 (1964).
13. 15 T.C. 31 (1950), aff'd per curiam, 192 F.2d 392 (2d Cir. 1951).
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amount is equity capital. Significantly, the court did not declare these
advances a second class of stock simply because they constituted
equity capital. Instead, it found that the advances were preferred in
fact over the common stock, and therefore constituted a second class
of stock. In Henderson v. United States,14 the court held that certain
shareholders' advances were investments of equity capital, and, under
the Commissioner's regulation constituted a second class of stock as
a matter of law.
The majority in the instant case found that the Commissioner's
regulation enlarged the scope of the statute beyond the intent of Con-
gress in that it restricted stockholders from making advances to elect-
ing corporations. The court held, therefore, that to classify all debt
obligations found to be equity capital as a second class of stock per se,
was beyond the Commissioner's powers. The court then considered
whether the notes in question were, in fact, a second class of stock.
It examined the notes to determine whether they gave the holders any
rights and interests in the corporation different from those they owned
as holders of the nominal stock. The court found that no new rights
or interests were created by the notes because the advances were made
by the sole shareholders of the corporation in direct proportion to
their stock interests in the corporation. Neither stockholder gained
any preference over the other because of these notes, and whatever
preferences were present, were only preferences over themselves as
stockholders. The court found that the advances were neither true
debt obligations nor a second class of stock. Rather, they were merely
capital contributions and, in reality, reflected the value of the common
stock already held. The majority distinguished Catalina Homes 5 and
Henderson v. United States16 on the grounds that those cases were
decided only on the issue of whether advances by stockholders were
in fact loans or equity capital, and did not involve the validity of
the Commissioner's regulation. The concurring judges did not think
it necessary to question the validity of the Commissioner's regulation
because even under the regulation, these notes were not "actually
stock." To be "actually stock," all the elements of the debt obligation
had to be the same as the elements characterizing a share of stock.
The concurring judges were unable to find any such characteristics in
these demand notes.
17
14. 245 F. Supp. 782 (M.D. Ala. 1965).
15. Supra note 12.
16. Supra note 14.
17. In a separate concurring opinion,- two ,judges expressed a fear that under the
Commissioner's regulation any type of loan would throw a cloud over a small business
corporation. It was reemphasized that the second class of stock doctrine, as stated in
the regulations, -was inconsistent with the intent of Congress and likely to produce
grave inequities. W.C. Gamman, P-H TAx CT. REa. & MEm. DEC. ff 46.1, at 46-9.
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By striking down the per se application of the second class of stock
rule, Gamman will relieve some of the uncertainties of future tax
treatment to shareholders making advances to electing corporations.
The thin incorporation problem of whether advances constitute debt
or equity capital should no longer affect businesses electing under
subchapter S because the taxpayer may now freely acknowledge
that the purpose of a loan is a contribution to equity capital. The
Commissioner will now be forced to show that contributions to equity
capital convey new and different rights and interests in the corporation
from those held by the present stockholders. The decision is desirable
since thin incorporation has no logical relation to the question of
whether there is in fact a second class of stock. While thin incorpora-
tion is relevant for determining the deductibility of interest payments
on purported debt obligations, it is arbitrary, if not illogical to argue
that because a purported debt is in reality equity capital, it is neces-
sarily a second class of stock. Thin incorporation is still applicable to
an electing subchapter S corporation where purported interest pay-
ments to creditors are in fact dividends to shareholders. However,
for purposes of determining whether there is more than one class of
stock, the test should be whether the shareholders' advances create
new rights and interests in the corporation. Accordingly, the decision
has the beneficial effect of permitting a small businessman to use
personal funds to capitalize his venture without being penalized by the
tax laws. As a practical matter, shareholders' loans are not usually
made unless outside financing is impossible. It is unrealistic to dis-
qualify an electing corporation from subchapter S because it has
behaved in a manner calculated to carry out the express purpose of
the act. While the decision does not offer a specific test for determin-
ing what constitutes a second class of stock, it is now clear that equity
capital must create new rights and interests before disqualification
will result. 8
The dissenting opinion stated that the second class of stock regulation fell within the
Commissioner's rule-making power and was clearly not inconsistent with the statute.
Since the loans had been held to be equity capital, they should have been classed as
a second class of stock because of different rights and liabilities which made the notes
resemble cumulative non-participating redeemable preferred stock. It was thought to
be "no answer" that these different rights and liabilities were, as found by the
majority, not to be enforced. Ibid.
18. In Lewis Bldg. & Supplies, Inc., 25 CCH Tax Ct. Mem. 844 (June 30, 1966),
the court denied the Commissioner's contention that promissory notes issued by two
shareholders in proportion to their stock ownership, and which were non-interest
bearing and had no fixed maturity date, were, as a matter of law, a second class of
stock. The Tax Court held that these were equity advances, but did not constitute a
second class of stock because they gave the holders no rights or interests different
than those they already had. Note that this case follows Gamman and represents an
even stronger decision for the taxpayer because the notes in question resembled debt
obligations even less than did the notes in Gamman.
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Torts-Damages-Recovery for Wrongful Death of
Adult Daughter Should Include Compensation
for Lost Investment
The parents of a twenty-one-year-old college girl brought an action
under the Michigan wrongful death statute1 to recover damages for
their daughter's death in an automobile collision. The statute limited
recovery to only the "pecuniary injury"2 resulting from the wrongful
death. The defendant conceded that loss of society and companion-
ship was a pecuniary injury, but argued that the parents' investment
in the child should not be considered by the jury in its assessment
of damages since the parents were not financially dependent upon
the child. The court submitted the case to the jury without instruc-
tions on the question of lost investment. On appeal from a judgment
entered on a jury verdict of 26,500 dollars for loss of society and
companionship,3 the Supreme Court of Michigan, held, affirmed with
respect to the award of damages for loss of society and companion-
ship; remanded, however, with directions to consider elements of
damage beyond mere loss of future companionship.4 In a wrongful
death action by the parents of a deceased adult dependent, recovery
should compensate the parents for their lost investment, as well as
for their loss of society and companionship, even though the parents
were neither dependent upon nor could reasonably anticipate future
contributions from the deceased. CuiTie v. Fiting, 375 Mich. 440,
134 N.W.2d 611 (1965).
At common'law, the death of a person due to injuries sustained by
the wrongful conduct of another extinguished any cause of action that
the deceased party might have had,5 and also left his surviving de-
pendents with no legal remedy. However, every state has enacted
statutes abrogating the harshness of this common law rule,6 and
1. Micir. STAT. ANN. § 27A.2922 (2) (rev. 1962).
2. "[TJhe court or the jury may give such damages, as, the court or the jury, shall
deem fair and just, with reference to the pecuniary injury resulting from such
death .. " Ibid. (Emphasis added.)
3. The award of $26,500 was arrived at by allowing $1000 per year for the
average life expectancy of the decedents parents (26.5 years). The total award was
$32,778, which included, in addition to the $26,500 for loss of society and com-
panionship, $3,147 for funeral and burial expenses and $3,131 for interest from the
date of the accident.
4. This case was also remanded because the lower court had failed to reduce the
$26,500, the amount awarded the parents for loss of society and companionship, as
prospective damages, to its present worth. This was held to have been reversible error.
5. McCoiMncK, DAMAGES § 93 (1935); OLECK, DAMAGES TO PERSONS AND PROPERTY
§ 195 (rev. ed. 1961); TIFFANY, DEATH By WRONGFUL AcT § 1 (2d ed. 1913);
Smedley, Wrongful Death-Basis of the Common Law Rules, 13 VAND. L. REv. 605
(1960).
6. Van Beeck v. Sabine Towing Co., 300 U.S. 342 (1937). "In this country, statutes
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several states now have Death Injury Acts 7 which create in the
decedent's nearest relatives a new cause of action based upon the
wrongful death.8 These acts permit recovery of whatever damages
the jury deems "proportionate to the injury."9 In many states, the
legislatures have expressly limited recovery under these acts to
"pecuniary" losses; 10 but in a few states it has been left to the courts
to read a pecuniary limitation into their statutes." In applying this
pecuniary limitation, the courts have ostensibly employed a "strict
pecuniary loss" formula to determine the amount of pecuniary injury
suffered by the parents as a result of their child's wrongful death.
12
This formula permits recovery of the total filial contributions rea-
substantially the same in tenor [as Lord Campbell's Act] followed in quick succession
in one state after another, till today there is not a state of the Union in which a remedy
is lacking." Id. at 346; 2 HamEn & JAMEs, ToRTs § 24.1, at 1284 (1956); Pnossun,
TORTs § 121, at 924 (3d ed. 1964); 1949 N.Y. Law Revision Comm'n 235 n.40;
51 Comxzrrr L.Q. 425 (1966).
7. Fatal Accidents Act (Lord Campbell's Act), 9 & 10 Vict., c. 93 (1846).
8. Survival Acts also exist which differ from the Wrongful Death Acts. The distinc-
tion between these statutes is that while the Wrongful Death Acts create a new
cause of action, the Survival Acts merely continue in existence the injured person's
claim after his death as an asset of his estate. McCoRnucK, op. cit. supra note 5,
at 336; Or.Ec, op. cit. supra note 5, at 320; Evans, A Comparative Study of the
Statutory Survival of Tort Claims, For and Against Executors and Administrators, 29
Micr. L. REv. 969 (1931).
9. See note 7 supra.
10. See, e.g., Anx. STAT. ANN. § 27-909 (1962) ("such damages as will be
fair and just compensation with reference to the pecuniary injuries . . . resulting from
such death .... "); ME. RPv. STAT. ANN. ch. 18, § 2552 (1954) ("such damages as
they shall deem a fair and just compensation, not exceeding $30,000, with reference to
the pecuniary injuries resulting from such death. ... ); N.J. STAT. ANN. § 2A 31-5
(1952) ("such damages as they shall deem fair and just with reference to the
pecuniary injuries resulting from such death .... ."); N.M. STAT. ANN. § 22-20-3
(1953) ("such damages, compensatory and exemplary, as they shall deem fair and just,
taking into consideration the pecuniary injury or injuries resulting from such
death .... "); N.C. Gm. STAT. § 28-174 (1950) ("such damages as are a fair and
just compensation for the pecuniary injury resulting from such death.") (Emphasis
added.)
11. See, e.g., Fuentes v. Tucker, 31 Cal. 2d 1, 187 P.2d 752 (1947) ("just" damages
consist of the pecuniary loss to the parents); Consolidated Stone Co. v. Staggs, 164 Ind.
331, 73 N.E. 695 (1905) (statute containing general language construed to mean
compensation for the pecuniary loss sustained); Dow v. Legg, 120 Neb. 271, 231
N.W. 747 (1930) (statute containing general language construed to require that loss
be of pecuniary nature); Evans v. Oregon Short Line Ry., 37 Utah 431, 108 Pac.
638 (1910) ("just" damages held to mean the present value of the future contribu-
tions and earnings minus the cost of living); Blake v. Midland Ry., 18 Q.B. 93, 118
Eng. Rep. 35 (1852) (compensation should be limited to the parents' pecuniary loss
under the Fatal Injuries Act).
12. This formula is also referred to as the "child-labor" measure of pecuniary loss
or as the "wage-profit yardstick of contributions less expenses" measure. In Wycko
v. Gnodtke, 361 Mich. 331, 338, 105 N.W.2d 118, 122 (1960), the court, in expressly
rejecting the formula, referred to it as "the child-labor measure of the pecuniary loss
suffered through the death of the minor child, namely, his probable wages less the
cost of his keep .... "
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sonably anticipated by the parents, reduced by the probable parental
expense of raising the deceased child to majority.13 It generally does
not include the reasonable anticipation of filial contributions beyond
the child's minority.'14 More and more courts, however, have recog-
nized the unreasonableness of this "strict pecuniary formula" and many
now permit recovery for reasonably anticipated contributions beyond
the child's minority.'5  Other courts have taken even longer strides
in an attempt to broaden parental recovery under the Death Injury
Acts. Some have permitted jury consideration of the parents' loss of
society and companionship as an element of damage, 6 and some have
allowed consideration of parental investment incurred in raising the
child.' 7 A few have even expressly disavowed adherence to the strict
pecuniary loss formula.'8 Wycko v. Gnodtke,19 the forerunner of the
13. When the child is in his majority no reduction for probable expenses of rearing
is made from the recovery because it is assumed there will not be any more of such
expenses.
14. Generally, the cases which have not permitted the consideration of future
contributions to extend into majority have been old ones, which based this conclusion
upon the idea that the loss of benefits after minority was too speculative to be the
basis of an award since the minor might not have lived until majority, might have
married, or might have been unable or unwilling to contribute to the support of his
parents. See, e.g., Agricultural & Mechanical Ass'n v. State, 71 Md. 86, 18 Atl. 37
(1886) (contributions after majority only a matter of "vague conjecture" which could
furnish no "reasonable foundation" for a verdict); Parsons v. Missouri Pac. By., 94
Mo. 286, 6 S.W. 464 (1887) (damages for the pecuniary benefit the parents could
hope to derive from the child could include only that benefit derived during his
minority); Frantz v. Gower, 119 Pa. Super. 156, 180 Atl. 716 (1935) (no recovery
for the value of services reasonably expected to be received after the child reached
majority, notwithstanding that the decedent was the parents' mainstay at the time of
his death).
15. See, e.g., Herbertson v. Russel, 150 Colo. 110, 371 P.2d 422 (1962) (net
pecuniary loss can include loss of services and support which parents would have
reasonably anticipated during their "declining years"); Caldwell v. Abernathy, 231
N.C. 692, 58 S.E.2d 763 (1950) (damages can include amounts which will fairly and
reasonably compensate for financial loss sustained after child reaches majoirty); Flory
v. New York Cent. R.R., 170 Ohio St. 185, 163 N.E.2d 902 (1959) (loss of chance
for future support proper consideration upon minor's death).
16. See, e.g,. Fuentes v. Tucker, supra note 11 (damages consist of the pecuniary
loss to the parents in being deprived of the services, earnings, society, comfort and
protection of the child); da Silva v. J. M. Martinal Shipbuilding Corp., 153 Cal. App.
2d 397, 314 P.2d 598 (1957) (damages may include the value of the loss of comfort,
society and protection of the deceased minor); Anderson v. Great No. Ry., 15 Idaho
513, 99 Pac. 91 (1908) (the jury in determining damages could consider the loss of
compensation to the father occasioned by the child's death); Fussner v. Andert, 261
Minn. 347, 113 N.W.2d 355 (1961) (award to parents may include the value of the
loss of the deceased child's comfort and society); Boroughs v. Oliver, 226 Miss. 609,
85 So. 2d 191 (1956) (the jury may consider the loss of companionship of the child
in an award to its mother).
17. Currie v. Fiting, 375 Mich. 440, 134 N.W.2d 611 (1965); Wycko v. Gnodtke,
supra note 12.
18. Hoyt v. United States, 286 F.2d 356 (5th Cir. 1961) (Congress did not intend
for a deduction to be made for the cost of rearing the child to majority in an action for
the death of seven-year-old boy brought under the Federal Tort Claims Act); Wycko
VANDERBILT LAW REVIEW
instant case, adopted all of these progressive trends in an action
brought for the wrongful death of a fourteen-year-old boy. When
read in light of this later decision, however, it assumes even more
significance.
The majority in Currie affirmed the lower court's award of damages
for loss of society and companionship. It remanded the case, how-
ever, directing the lower court to submit consideration of the parents'
lost investment to the jury. In determining the extent of this loss the
jury was to consider parental expenses of birth, food, clothing, in-
struction, nurture, and shelter.
This decision is important for several reasons. It extends the
application of Wycko to a situation where the deceased was in her
majority, and, for the first time, it clearly indicates that parents need
no longer to show either the deceased child's past contributions and
services, or those he could have potentially rendered in the future, in
order to recover for the wrongful death. As a result of these two
cases, there now exists a new element of damages unique to Michigan.
This might be termed the "lost investment" element by virtue of
which parents may now recover most of the expenses and costs in-
curred in raising the child. The question arises as to whether the
application of this element of damages will lead to incongruous results.
For example, it would appear that parents investing rather large
amounts in raising their child to majority might recover a substantial
sum, whereas parents making a more modest investment in their child
might recover far less. Thus, the wrongful death statute might serve
to aggrandize the wealthy while causing the poor to suffer from their
own inability to expend more. In actual practice, however, this in-
congruity is probably more theoretical than real, since a substantial
recovery for loss of society and companionship will usually be possible.
Currie and Wycko have had a substantial cumulative impact on
wrongful death recovery in Michigan. The Michigan statute expressly
limits recovery to pecuniary loss,2 0 and the court has consistently
construed this requirement as permitting recovery only where rea-
sonable anticipation of future contributions was shown. As a result
of these two cases, however, it now appears this requirement is no
longer necessary, and that the Michigan courts will, in the future,
construe the statute so as to permit such recovery as will compensate
fairly for the injury. Whether the other jurisdictions which still
v. Gnodtke, supra note 12 (the child-labor formula, namely, the deduction of the cost
of the child's keep from his probable wages, is no longer applicable in determining the
amount which parents may recover for the death of a minor child); Fussner v. Andert,
supra note 16 (the court rejected the strict pecuniary loss test).
19. Supra note 12.
20. See note 2 supra.
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purportedly apply the pecuniary loss formula will follow suit is open
to speculation. Since parents of deceased children have been per-
mitted substantial recovery in most of these jurisdictions,21 it would
seem that the pecuniary loss formula is not being strictly applied even
in those jurisdictions claiming adherence to the formula.
21. See, e.g., Southern Ry. v. Miller, 285 F.2d 202 (6th Cir. 1960), in which the
Tennessee Supreme Court, interpreting the state's wrongful death statute, affimed a
$22,510 award for the death of two girls, ages 11 and 13, holding that the amount re-
coverable is the pecuniary value of the life of the deceased; Reed v. Gulf Oil Corp., 217
F. Supp. 370 (D.D.C. 1963), in which $20,000 was recovered for the death of a
seven-year-old boy even though the jury was instructed that from the expected earnings
and future contributions should be deducted the cost of rearing the deceased; Cron-
berg v. United States, 123 F. Supp. 693 (E.D.N.C. 1954), in which the estate of the
deceased sixteen-year-old boy was allowed a recovery of $35,000 even though the
measure of damages was said to be the present net value of the net pecuniary worth
of the deceased, which was to be ascertained by deducting the probable cost of his
own living expenses from the probable gross income derived from his own expectations;
McKirdy v. Cascio, 142 Conn. 80, 111 A.2d 555 (1955), in which the court, although
claiming to apply the strict pecuniary loss test, allowed a $50,000 award for the death of
an eighteen-year-old high school boy with some musical talent, who was contemplating
college and had a job available if he wished to work; Lafferty v. Wattle, 349 S.W.2d 519
(Mo. Ct. App. 1961), in which $15,000 was held not excessive for the death of a
thirteen-year-old girl who was well liked, above average in school, and a great help
around the house, even though the measure of damages allegedly applied was the
pecuniary loss suffered by the parents less the anticipated costs of rearing the child to
majority; Gluckauf v. Pine Lake Beach Club, Inc., 78 N.J. Super. 8, 187 A.2d 357
(NJ. App. Div. 1963), in which $32,000 was awarded for the death of a fifteen-year-old
boy who ranked in the top of his class academically even though the jury was instructed
the award should represent no more than the present value of the expectancy of future
net pecuniary benefits.
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